Access Denied: Improper use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites by Davik, Christine Galbraith
University of Maine School of Law
University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2004
Access Denied: Improper use of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on
Publicly Accessible Internet Websites
Christine Galbraith Davik
University of Maine School of Law, christine.davik@maine.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty-
publications
Part of the Computer Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.
Suggested Bluebook Citation
Christine G. Davik, Access Denied: Improper use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible
Internet Websites, 63 Md. L. Rev. 320 (2004).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty-publications/15
ACCESS DENIED: IMPROPER USE OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD 

AND ABUSE ACT TO CONTROL INFORMATION ON 

PUBLICLY ACCESSffiLE INTERNET WEBSITES 

CHRISTINE D. GALBRAITH* 
Imagine that you are walking down the sidewalk on a public 
street on your way to the grocery store. You notice a new produce 
market with a huge front display window that has a sign stating 
"Grand Opening: Huge Produce Sale." The advertisement lists the 
price per pound of various fruits and vegetables and is completely visi­
ble from the street. You copy down the prices of various items on a 
piece of paper you have in your wallet, intending to compare the 
prices advertised with those at the grocery store you normally 
frequent. 
Have you done something wrong? Could your behavior even be 
categorized as criminal? Such a suggestion probably seems absurd. 
Nonetheless, strange as it may seem, if this same scenario were to oc­
cur within the electronic world, it is possible that you might have vio­
lated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 1 
Hacking has been defined as illegally gaining access to and some­
times tampering with information in a computer system.2 Addition­
ally, transmitting a computer virus that corrupts and disables a 
computer system also constitutes hacking.3 But does hacking include 
accessing and using the uncopyrightable, factual information4 that a 
company has chosen to post on a publicly accessible website?5 Anum­
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. B.S., University of 
Illinois; J.D., University of Illinois. Many thanks to Maureen O'Rourke, Laura Underkuf. 
fler, Colleen Khoury, Lois Lupica, jennifer Wriggins, and Don Zillman for their insightful 
comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Addi~onally, I would like to thank the partici­
pants in both the New England junior Faculty Exchange and the Faculty Workshop at the 
University of Maine School of Law for allowing me to present the arguments in this paper 
at an early stage of development, as well as obtain invaluable comments and thoughts. 
I. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
2. See Merriam-Webster Online, at http://www.merriamwebster.com (last visited Jan. 
21, 2004) (defining "hack" as "to gain access to a computer illegally"). 
3. See Michael Lee et al., Electronic Commerce, Hackers, and the Search f<rr Legiti11UlCJ: A 
Regulatury Proposa~ 14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 839, 849 (1999) (noting that "[i]njecting mali­
cious code (commonly referred to as 'viruses') is another type of hacking with potentially 
devastating effects"). 
4. See infra Part II (distinguishing protectable and unprotectable material under copy­
right law). 
5. The tenn "publicly accessible" or "publicly available" refers to websites on the 
World Wide Web that are openly accessible to the general public. 
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ber of companies have recently tried to argue-and have surprisingly 
succeeded-in convincing courts that it should.6 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet, once used only by government agencies and univer­
sities, has quickly become an important mechanism for commerce.7 
In 1991, the first web page in the United States was posted on the 
World Wide Web.8 Current estimates, however, place the number of 
web pages on the Internet at three billion.9 This phenomenal rate of 
growth is due in large part to the utilization of the Internet as a major 
commercial center. Companies once relegated to the world of "bricks 
and mortar,"10 have now staked out their place in cyberspace. This 
often includes creating a website that provides information to the 
public about the goods or services the company offers, as well as a 
means for obtaining or ordering them. 11 The free flow of information 
is viewed as one of the most important and defining features of the 
Internet,12 leading to its nickname, the "Information Superhighway." 
Unfortunately, data once unquestionably part of the public do­
main is now increasingly becoming subjected to private claims of own­
ership. In an attempt to control competition and maintain market 
share, companies are now seeking to prevent the utilization of the 
6. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(enjoining defendant from accessing noncopyrightable information on plaintiff's website). 
7. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that "companies are racing to stake out their place in cyber­
space"); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing 
the rapid growth of the World Wide Web), 
8. Paul Festa, Ten Yean' Ago: Switching on the World Wide Web, CNET News.com, Dec. 10, 
2001, at http:/ /news.zdnet.co.uk. 
9. Yuki Nogachi, Online Search Engines Help Lift Cou1!1' of Priuacy, WASH. PosT, Feb. 9, 
2004, at AI. 
10. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 n.ll (N.D. 
Cal. 2000). 
The phrase "brick and mortar" is often used to designate a traditional business 
when contrasting it with a predominantly, or entirely, on-line business. The 
phrase appears to refer to the historical reliance on conducting commerce within 
the context of a physical space made from materials such as brick and mortar, as 
opposed to the modem trend toward conducting commerce in a cyberspace 
made from computer programs. 
I d. 
11. See, e.g., Bestbuy.com, at http:/ /www.bestbuy.com (providing information regard­
ing the retailer's products and giving customers the option of buying these products on­
line). 
12. Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Vinual Gatekeepm and the Right to Exclude 
Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REv. 179, 183 (2001) (asserting that "[t]he decentralized nature 
of the Internet was considered one of its most significant characteristics" and that the In­
ternet was expecte~ to create "a potentially more decentralized flow of infonna~on"). 
322 MARYLAND LAw REVIEW [\bL. 63:320 
factual information on their websites by those they deem unwel­
come.13 However, this data, which website owners are seeking to pro­
tect, is material that they have intentionally released for public 
review. 14 Furthermore, the information itself does not qualify for 
copyright protection because it does not meet the constitutional re­
quirement of originality. 15 AI; such, it should be part of the public 
domain and, therefore, available to anyone without restriction. 16 Any 
attempt to grant private rights in this information arguably runs afoul 
of the Intellectual Property Clause and the First Amendment. 17 
Despite this, companies have argued that they have proprietary 
rights in the information contained on these websites or alternatively 
on the servers upon which the publicly available websites reside.18 
Furthermore, they have argued that as property owners they alone can 
decide the terms upon which access is granted to these Internet sites, 
as well as the way in which the information contained therein can be 
used. 19 To the extent that any conduct exceeds the scope of these 
virtually unchecked restrictions, the companies contend that such be­
havior amounts to hacking-even if it causes no real harm.20 
In particular, many of these companies have tried to prevent elec­
tronic data gatherers from accessing and utilizing the information on 
their websites. 21 These computerized agents-often referred to as 
"robots," "spiders," or "crawlers"-can quickly and efficiently collect 
the public information contained on a website.22 However, because 
13. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) 
(describing the plaintiff's desire to enjoin the defendant from accessing the plaintiff's 
database). 
14. See, e.g., id. (noting that the plaintiff pursued the suit even though it "acknowl· 
edge[d] its obligation to provide public access to its customers' contact information"). 
15. See infra Part II (discussing requirements for copyright protection). 
16. See infra Part VII (proposing an amendment to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
that would deny proteCtion for factual information on publicly accessible websites). · 
17. See infra Part II (reviewing the constitutional restraints on copyright protection). 
18. See infra Part V; see also Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the 
internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 561, 57480 (2001) (dis­
cussing cases in which companies sued aggregators of product and pricing information). 
19. In one case, for example, the website owner objected to the defendant copying 
facts from the plaintiff's website and publishing those facts in its own format. See Tick~ 
etmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. I 0, 2000). 
20. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (noting that eBay argued that the defendant "interferred with eBay's possessory in· 
terest in its computer system" by using data obtained from eBay's website). 
21. See, e.g., id. 
22. See O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570 (stating that those tools "allow the engines to 
amass information more quickly than a manual approach that would require entering each 
link into the browser and following its path"). 
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software robots are generally used by competitors, as opposed to po­
tential customers, they are often viewed as unwelcome guests. 
Nevertheless, choosing to place a publicly accessible website on 
the Internet should indicate consent to at least a certain amount of 
access and use of such information by both private and commercial 
users.23 Furthermore, the fact that someone or something has a com­
mercial purpose should not determine whether access is proper. This 
is particularly true in light of the public benefit that accrues from 
competition in the marketplace.24 Additionally, these robots are. col­
lecting non-copyrightable information that is generally designed to be 
free. 25 
In this battle for control, companies have recently turned to a 
new weapon-the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).26 The 
CFAA was originally enacted in 1984 as a criminal statute to address 
hacking and the growing problem of computer crime.27 In a single, 
comprehensive statute, it sought to define illegal conduct and provide 
for criminal liability. The statute has been amended several times, 
most recently in 2001.28 One of the most notable changes occurred in 
1994 when a civil remedy was added.29 Congress originally conceived 
the CFAA as a way to encourage institutions to improve computer se­
curity practices and supplement the resources of law enforcement in 
combating computer crime.30 
However, the CFAA is now being used to control access to and 
the use of information contained on publicly available websites. 31 Re­
cent court decisions have allowed website owners to utilize the CFAA 
to override the carefully balanced provisions of the copyright laws and 
improperly restrict speech in violation of the First Amendment. 32 Ad­
ditionally with recent changes to the CFAA, a website owner will often 
23. ld. at 620. 
24. See infra Part IV; see also O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 620. 
25. Lawrence Lessig, Fornnard to Symposium: Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm, 
52 STAN. L. REv. 987, 996 (2000). 
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
27. The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98473, 98 StaL 1837, 2190 (1984); see infra Part III. 
28. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814, 115 StaL 366, 382 (2001). 
29. Pub. L. No. 10$-322, § 290001, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097-99 (1994). 
30. 146 CoNe. REc. 510,916 (daily ed. OcL 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
31. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., I26 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
'(enjoining defendant from accessing publicly available information on plaintiff's website); 
see also infra notes 126-143 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and the holding of 
Register.wm). 
32. See &gistl!1'.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 255; see also infra notes 317-319 and accom­
panying text (explaining that a statute protecting factual material may violate the First 
Amendment). 
324 MARYLAND LAw REVIEW [\bL. 63:320 
find that the elements required for a CFAA cause of action are far 
easier to prove than any other type of potentially applicable claim, 
including the common law claim of trespass. 33 
This Article argues that, although many of these actions may fall 
within the _literal language of the CFAA, such cases were never in­
tended to be covered by the statute. Additionally, by allowing website 
owners to protect information that is not protectable under copyright 
law, the CFAA unconstitutionally overrides the delicate balance of 
rights between authors and the public. Such a sweeping reading of 
prohibited acts under the CFAA threatens the free flow of informa­
tion that belongs in the public domain. As a result, the continued 
openness of the Internet, along with its attendant benefits, is at risk. 
This Article begins in Part II by briefly explaining why the factual 
information that website owners seek to control is not protectable 
under copyright law. Next, Part III of this Article examines the history 
and purpose of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Part IV explores 
the way in which software robots gather information on the Internet 
and why companies have tried to limit their use. Part V looks at the 
elements of a CFAA claim, including the way companies have sought 
to define unauthorized access under the Act. Part VI discusses the 
constitutional confines within which Congress can create private prop­
erty rights in information. Part VI also examines the proprietary 
rights of publicly accessible website owners and whether such rights 
should include the right to prohibit software robots from accessing 
the information contained on their Internet sites or alternatively the 
servers upon which the websites reside. Part VII suggests language 
that could be used to amend the CFAA to ensure its constitutionality. 
Additionally, Part VII reviews and evaluates alternative methods for 
controlling truly harmful robot behavior. 
II. CoPYRIGHT LAw 
The Copyright Act34 provides that copyright protection extends 
to only "original works of authorship," as originality is a constitutional 
requirement.35 To be original, the work must be independently cre­
ated, in other words not copied from another work. Additionally, it 
33. See infra notes 26&-296 and accompanying text (discussing changes to the CFAA"s 
definition of loss). 
34. 17 u.s.c. § 102 (2000). 
35. U.S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to "secur[e] for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); 
see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (declaring that 
"[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement"). 
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must possess "at least some minimal degree of creativity."36 This re­
quirement is not particularly burdensome, as a relatively low level of 
creativity will usually suffice. 37 
Facts, however, do not even meet this modest threshold. As the 
Supreme Court made clear in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Seroice Co., 38 "[n]o one may claim originality as to facts ... because 
facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship ...·. [T] hey may 
not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to 
every person."39 This is because one who reports a particular fact has 
not created it; he or she has merely discovered its existence.40 Be­
cause data is not "original" in the constitutional sense, it may not be 
copyrighted.41 Instead, it remains in the public domain, available to 
42every person. 
This is true even if the facts are contained within a work that is 
copyrightable as a whole. One fundamental principle of copyright law 
is the "idea-expression" or "fact-expression" dichotomy, which applies 
to all works of authorship.43 In the context of factual works, only the 
author's selection and arrangement may be protected, while the facts 
themselves may be copied at wi11.44 This secures protection for the 
author's original expression, while allowing others to freely build 
upon the ideas and information contained within a work without seek­
ing the creator's permission.45 As the Supreme Court has explained, 
"[t]his result is neither unfair nor unfortunate, [but] is the means by 
which copyright advances the progress of science and art."46 Copy­
right seeks to reward originality, not effort.47 
For example, the Copyright Act expressly provides for the protec­
tion of compilations.48 A compilation consists of a collection of preex­
36. Feis~ 499 U.S. at 345 (citing I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, CoPYRIGHT§§ 2.01 [A], [8] 
(1990)). 
37. Id. 
38. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
39. /d. at 347-48 (citing I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COP'iRIGHT §§ 2.01 (A], (B] (1990) 
and Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
40. !d. at 347. 
41. /d. 
42. /d. at 348 (citing Miller, 650 F.2d at 1369). 
43. !d. at 350. 
44. !d. 
45. !d. at 350-51. 
46. !d. at 350. 
47. !d. at 359-60 ("[O]riginality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is the touchstone of copyright 
protection in directories and other fact-based works ... ). 
48. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (stating that "[t]he subject matter of copyright as specified 
. by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works")., 
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isting data selected and arranged by an author.49 If the organization 
of the materials is made independently by the compiler and entails a 
minimal degree of creativity, such works contain sufficient originality 
to be entitled to copyright protection.5° A subsequent compiler, how­
ever, is free to use the facts contained in another's work so long as the 
new work does not include the same selection and arrangement of 
materiaJ.51 The mere inclusion of a particular fact in a work does not 
transform that fact into protectable intellectual property.5 2 
In the context of a website, even though some elements of an 
Internet site may be protectable under the copyright law, factual infor­
mation is supposed to remain in the public domain.53 For example, a 
site may contain photographs or illustrations that may be copyrighted. 
However, information concerning a particular product's price, dimen­
sions, or the sizes in which it is available are merely facts that anyone 
else should be free to use.54 Furthermore, the extraction and use of 
such information is "essential to achieving the constitutional goal of 
copyright law."55 The balance of rights in copyright law is rooted in 
the belief that society is best served by the free flow of information.56 
As facts and ideas constitute the building blocks of knowledge, it is 
imperative that they remain within the public domain. Despite the 
recent claims of website owners to the contrary, the use of such infor­
mation without the website owner's permission should not constitute 
a criminal act. 
Ill. HISTORY OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE A= 
In response to a growing wave of hacking incidents and related 
computer fraud, Congress enacted the first federal computer crime 
statute in 1984 entitled the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (Counterfeit Access Device Act).57 Instead of 
49. !d. § I 01. 
50. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. 
51. !d. at 349. 
52. /d. at 35().56. 
53. See zd. at 348 (declaring that "all facts-scientific, historical, biographical-are part 
of the public domain"). 
54. See zd. at 349 ("[T]he very same facts and ideas may be divorced from the context 
imposed by the author, and restated or reshuffied by second comers, even if the author was 
the first to discover the facts or to propose the ideas."). 
55. J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, lntelkctual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. 
R£v. 51, 129 (1997). 
56. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50. 
57. The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 9~73, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 
(2000)); Jeff Nemerofsky, The Crime of "Interruption of Computer Services to Authorized Users" 
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identifying and amending every potentially applicable statute affected 
by advances in computer technology, Congress chose to address the 
subject in a single statute.58 "Congress was reluctant to preempt 
scope.
or interfere with local and state computer crime authorities,"59 
therefore, this original legislation was exceptionally narrow in 
60 
The statute prohibited unauthorized access to a computer sys­
tem,61 but it only applied to "federal interest computers,"62 generally 
Have you Ever Heard ofit?, 6 R!cH.j.L. & TECH. 23, ~ 13 (2000), available at http:/ /www.law. 
richmond.edu/jolt/v6i5/article2.html. 
58. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 5 (1996). 
59. Nemerofsky, supra note 57, 1 13. All fifty states have some form of computer crime 
legislation, however the scope of sanctioned conduct ranges from state to state: ALA. ConE 
§§ 13A-8-100 to -103 (1994); ALAsKA STAT.§§ 11.46.200(a)(3), 11.46.484(a)(3), 11.46.740, 
11.46.985 (Michie 2002); Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 13-230l(E), 13-2316 (West 2001); ARK. 
ConE ANN. §§ 5-41-101 to -108 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL ConE§§ 502, 502.01, 1203.047 
(West 1999 & Supp. 2003); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-5.5- 101 to -102 (West 1999 & 
Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 53a-250 to -261 (West 2001); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 
II,§§ 931-939 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 815.01-.07 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); GA. ConE 
ANN.§§ 16-9-90 to -94 (2003); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 708-890 to -895.7 (Michie 1999 & 
Supp. 2002); IDAHO ConE§§ 18-2201 to -2202 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003); 720 lt.t.. CoMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/160-1 to -7 (West 2003); IND. CooE ANN.§§ 35-43-1-4,35-43-2-3 (Michie 1998 
& Supp. 2001); IowA ConE ANN.§§ 702.1A, 702.14, 714.1, 716.68 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-3755 (1995 & Supp. 2002); Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 434.840-.860 (Banks-Baldwin 
2003); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 14:73.1-.5 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 
17-A, §§ 431-433 (West 1983 & Supp. 2002); Mo. CoDE ANN., CRIM. LAw§ 7-302 (2002); 
Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 146 (2002); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 266, §§ 30, 33A, 120F 
(West 2000); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§§ 752.791-.797 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); MINN. 
STAT. A'IN. §§ 609.87-.891 (West 2003); Miss. ConE ANN. §§ 97-45-1 to -13 (1994 & Supp. 
2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.095-.099 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003); MoNT. ConE ANN. 
§§ 45-6-310 to -3ll (2003); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-1343 to -1348 (1995); NEV. REv. STAT. 
A"<N. §§ 205.473-.513 (Michie 2001); N.H. REv. STAT, ANN.§§ 638:16 to :34 (1996 & Supp. 
2002); NJ. STAT. A'<N. §§ 2A:38A-l to -6 (West 2000), 2C:20-23 to -34 (West 1995); N.M. 
STAT. A"<N. §§ 30-45-1 to -7 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 156.00-.50 
(McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453 to -458 (2002); N.D. CENT. ConE §§ 12.1­
06.1-{Jl, 12.1-06.1-08 (1997 & Supp. 2003); OHIO REv. ConE ANN.§ 2913.04(8) (Anderson 
2002); OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1951-1958 (West 2002); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 164.125, 
164.377 (2001 ); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§§ 7603, 7611 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAws§§ 11­
52-1 to -8 (2002); S.C. CooE ANN. §§ 16-16-10 to -40 (Law. Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAws§§ 43-438-1 to -8 (Michie !997 & Supp. 2003); TENN. ConE ANN.§§ 39-14-601 to -603 
(1997 & Supp. 2002); TEx. PENAL CooE A"<N. §§ 33.01-.04 (Vernon 2003); UTAH ConE A'IN. 
§§ 76-6-701 to -705 (1995); VT. STAT. A"<N. tit. 13, §§ 4101-4107 (1998 & Supp. 2003); VA. 
ConE A'IN. §§ 18.2-152.2 to .14 (Michie 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A52.110-.!30 
(West 2000); W.VA. CODE ANN.§§ 61-3C-! to -21 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); Wis. STAT. 
ANN. § 943.70 (West 1996 & Supp. 2002); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-3-501 to -505 (Michie 
2003). 
60. Nemerofsky, supra note 57, 1 13. 
61. The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Puh. 
L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190-94 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 
(2000)). The Act made it a felony to knowingly access a computer without authorization 
or to exceed authorized access in order ~o obtain classified United States defense or for­
328 MARYLAND LAw REviEw [VoL. 63:320 
those computers operated by the federal government or a financial 
institution.63 This was due to Congress's belief that these computer 
systems merited special protection, as they contained the most sensi­
tive types of information-namely classified information, financial 
records, and credit histories.64 
However, because the Counterfeit Access Device Act only applied 
to select types of confidential information, it immediately fell subject 
to harsh criticism from legislators, industry leaders, and law enforce­
ment officials.65 Additionally, the law was deemed too vague and diffi­
cult to use.66 In fact, only one person was ever indicted under the 
1984 Counterfeit Access Device Act.67 
In response, Congress amended the Counterfeit Access Device 
Act in 1986 by enacting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA or 
the Act). 68 The CFAA eliminated some of the Counterfeit Access De­
vice Act's confusing language, defined additional terms, and ex­
panded its scope.69 In particular, three additional types of computer 
crimes were added: a computer fraud offense patterned after the fed­
eral mail and wire fraud statutes; an offense for the alteration, dam­
age, or destruction of information contained in a federal interest 
eign relations information with the intent or reason to believe that such information would 
be used to hann the United States or to advantage a foreign nation. /d. Additionally, the 
Act made it a misdemeanor to knowingly access a computer without authorization or to 
exceed authorized access to obtain information contained in a financial record of a finan­
cial institution or in a consumer file of a consumer reporting agency. /d. The 1984 Act 
also made it a misdemeanor to knowingly access a computer without authorization or to 
exceed authorized access in order to use, modify, destroy, or disclose information in, or 
prevent authorized use of, a computer operated for or on behalf of the United States if 
such conduct would affect the government's use of the computer. /d. 
62. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 4 (1996). A "federal interest computer" was defined as a 
computer 
exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government, 
·ar in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial 
institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the 
offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government. 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A) (2000). 
63. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 4. 
64. !d. at 3-5. 
65. Frank P. Andreano, The Evolution of Federal Computer Crime Policy: The Ad Hoc A~ 
proach to an Ever-Changing Problem, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81, 85-86 (1999) (noting that "loan 
records, corporate account information, or information concerning the bank's deposits in 
other institutions" were not within the scope of the act). 
66. !d. at 86; Glenn D. Baker, Note, Trespassers will be Prostcuted: Computer Crime in the 
1990s, 12 CoMPUTER/LJ. 61, 65 (1993). 
67. Baker, supa note 66, at 65. 
68. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213-16 
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)). 
69. Nemerofsky, supra note 57, 1.14. 
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computer; and an offense for the trafficking of unauthorized com­
puter passwords in certain circumstances.70 
Over time, however, Congress became increasingly concerned 
about loopholes in the statute that were arguably permitting some 
hackers to escape punishment.71 Additionally, both the type of activi­
ties in which hackers were engaging and their range of motivations 
had greatly broadened, making Congress eager to give the federal 
government more expansive authority to capture them.72 As a result, 
in 1994 Congress again amended the CFAA as part of a more compre­
hensive omnibus crime bill entitled The Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994.73 
Although the CFAA previously had dealt with only conduct re­
lated to the unauthorized access of a computer system, the 1994 
amendments expanded the coverage of the Act to include the trans­
mission of computer worms and viruses. 74 Moreover, the amendment 
added a civil remedy in addition to the statute's original criminal sanc­
tions?5 With the dramatic rise in the number of computer crime 
cases, the government did not have the ability to pursue all computer 
crime cases.76 As such, the civil remedy was designed to provide not 
only aggrieved individuals with the ability to obtain relief for violations 
of the Act, but also to increase the deterrent value of the statute.77 
The sponsors of the amendment made clear, however, that they 
certainly and expressly did not want to "open the floodgates to frivo­
lous litigation."78 But at the time this civil remedy was added, the 
CFAA still only applied to "federal interest computers," namely those 
computers that contained the most sensitive confidential information 
and were operated by the government or a financial institution.79 As a 
result, the pool of potential plaintiffs was quite limited. This, how­
ever, changed two years later. 
70. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act§ 2(d). 
71. Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don't They? An Economic Analysis of 
Anti-Hacking Regulatary Models, 89 Gw. LJ. 171, 179 (2000). 
72. !d. 
73. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 290001, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097-99 (1994). 
74. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 4 (1996); Nemerofsky, supra note 57, 1 26. 
75. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 290001(d), 108 Stat. at 2098. The civil remedy provision 
allowed victims of computer abuse to maintain actions against the violators to obtain com­
pensatory damages, if!iunctive relief, or other equilable relief. /d. 
76. 146 CoNe. R>:c. S10,916 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
77. !d. 
78. !d. (quoting 136 CoNe. R>:c. 54,614 (1990) (statement of Sen. Leahy)). 
79. !d. 
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The 1996 amendments to the CFAA80 expanded coverage of the 
Act to include not only "federal interest computers," but all com­
puters used in interstate commerce.81 This effectively extended the 
statute's reach to include any computer connected to the lnternet.82 
The change was prompted in part by a growing concern over the 
amount of financial losses suffered by American companies from the 
breach of computer security systems.83 With society's increased de­
pendence on computers, it was becoming clear that computer crime 
was not just a law enforcement issue, but had economic implications 
as well.84 
The sponsors of the bill, therefore, felt it was essential to extend 
the statute's scope to further protect the confidentiality of computer 
data, as well as the systems upon which the data resided.85 References 
can be found throughout the amendment's legislative history that 
support the premise that the changes were designed to safeguard the 
privacy of information.86 Ultimately, the amendment's sponsors 
80. The 1996 amendments to the Act were originally entitled the National Information 
Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 ("Nl!PA"). 142 CoNG. REc. SI0,889 (daily ed. Sept. 
18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy). But when the Nl!PA was introduced in 1995, it failed 
to emerge from the Judiciary Committee Proceedings. Nemerofsky, supra note 57, 'i 28. 
However, in October of 1996, President Clinton signed the Nl!PA into law as part of the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 201, llO Stat. 3488, 3491-93 
(1996). 
81. The term "federal interest computer" was replaced with "protected computer." See 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(2) (c) (2000). A "protected computer" was defined as a computer 
exclusively for the we of a financial institution or the United States Govemment, 
or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a finan­
cial institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the 
offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or 
which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication. 
!d.§ 1030(e)(2)(A)-(B). 
82. Calkins, supra note 71, at 180. 
83. 142 CoNG. REc. SI0,889 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy). A 
December 1995 report from the Computer Systems Policy Project, which included the 
CEOs from thirteen maJor computer companies, estimated that breaches of computer se­
curity resulted in financial losses of $2 to $4 billion dollars. I d. The report also predicted 
that the numbers were likely to rise to $40 to $80 billion dollars worldwide in the year 
2000. ld. 
84. Id. 
85. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 3 (1996) ("!. Purpose: [The amendment] would 
strengthen the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, by closing gaps in the 
law to protect better the confidentiality, integrity, and security of computer data and 
networks."). 
86. 142 CoNG. REc. Sl0,889 (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[W]hile our current statute, 
in section 1030(a)(2) prohibits misuse of a computer to obtain information from a finan­
cial institution, it falls short of protecting the privacy and confidentiality of information on 
computers used in interstate or foreign commerce and communications."); S. REP. No. 
104-357, at 7 (!996) ("The bill woulc;l amend 1030(a)(2) to increa•e protection for the 
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hoped that the changes would also help ensure the public's faith in 
the security of computer networks.87 Noticeably absent from the legis­
lative history, however, is any suggestion that Congress intended to 
widen dramatically the protection of the CFAA to include all informa­
tion and all computer systems on the Internet, such as non-copyright­
able data contained on publicly accessible websites.88 Nevertheless, 
the statutory language itself was not modified to make clear that the 
provisions of the CFAA only applied to private, confidential informa­
tion.89 Instead, the Act as drafted appears to include protection for 
any type of information, despite the legislative history to the 
contrary.90 
Most recently, the CFAA was amended in October of 2001 by the 
USA Patriot Act.91 The USA Patriot Act's provisions were primarily 
designed to combat terrorism and provide law enforcement with addi­
tional investigatory tools.92 However, the USA Patriot Act also in­
cluded language from an earlier Senate bill entitled The Internet 
Security Act of 2000.93 The USA Patriot Act amended the CFAA in 
order to rectifY some of the more technical ambiguities of the CFAA 
identified in earlier court cases and to clarify the scope of the civil 
remedy.94 However, there were no changes that explicitly restricted 
the scope of the Act to confidential information,95 and as such, the 
CFAA still arguably provides a potentially valuable tool for entities 
hoping to protect publicly accessible factual information.96 
privacy and confidentiality of computer information ... [t]he premise of this subsection is 
privacy protection."). 
87. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7. 
88. See id. (" [W] here the information stolen is also copyrighted. the theft may implicate 
certain rights under the copyright laws."). 
89. 18 U.S.C. § !030(a) (2)(C), (h) (2000) (stating that "[w]hoever ... intentionally 
accesse.s a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized acc:;ess, and thereby ob­
tains ... infonnation from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or 
foreign communication ... shall be punished"). The statute does not exclude information 
that is not protectable under copyright law. See id. 
90. See id. (failing to describe the type of information protected by the Act). 
91. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814, 115 Stat. 272, 382 
(2001). 
92. !d. § I. 
93. SeeS. 2448, 106th Cong., § 101-102 (2001). 
94. See 146 CoNG. REc. S!0,913-916 (daily ed. Oct 24, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(noting the reasons for modifying the CFAA). 
95. See 18 U .S.C. § I 030 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
96. See CarlS. Kaplan, Tough Tim£SjorDataRnhots, N.Y. TIMES, CvnrR LJ.,Jan. 12,2001, 
at htlp:/ /www.nytimes.com (noting that .. the easier it becomes to use the law to thwart 
robots, the easier it becomes for some companies to lock up or selectively protect publicly 
available information"). 
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IV. SorrwARE RosoTS 
Businesses are increasingly targeting software robots for exclu­
sion from their publicly available websites.97 A software robot is a 
computer program that can perform tasks on the Internet without 
human supervision.98 Some of the more typical functions include 
compiling results for search engines,99 filtering for inappropriate con­
tent, or obtaining information made publicly accessible on the web­
sites of others. 100 Software robots are capable of executing these tasks 
at speeds far in excess of what a human can accomplish. 101 
Software robots utilize the same web protocols as any individual 
would to initially access information from an Internet website. 102 
These hots simply request the information from the site, and the que­
ried server usually responds with a copy of the document re­
quested.103 However, unlike individuals, software robots engage in 
97. See, e.g., eBay. Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (enjoining an online auction aggregation company from copying factual informa· 
tion posted on a publicly accessible website). 
98. James C. Luh, No Bats Allowed!, EWEEK ENTERPRISE NEWS & REVIEWS, Apr. 16, 2001, 
wailable at http://www.eweek.com. 
99. See Nettis Envtl. Ltd. v. fWI, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1999). 
The court defined a search engine as follows: 
[A) special kind ofwebsite, containing a database of other known websites, associ­
ating certain keywords with each website. The user provides the search engine 
with [a term] or terms of interest to the user, and the search engine responds 
with a list of websites on its database associated with the terms submitted by the 
user. 
!d.; see also Christine D. Galbraith, Ekctronic Billboards Along the Itiformation Superhighway: 
Liability Under the Lanham Act for Using Trademarks to Key Internet Banner Ads, 41 B.C. L. REv. 
847, 851-53 (2000) (discussing how search engines compile their search results). Some of 
the most well-known search engines include Excite, Coogle, AltaVista, and Netscape. Id. at 
851. 
100. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explotica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001). 
101. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 106(}.61. 
102. O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570 (noting that bots use the same web protocol as the 
typical Internet user). 
103. Id. This is not to say, however, that a server wil1 always provide the requested infor­
mation. Software robots are launched from a particular Internet Protocol (IP) address. 
David Kramer &Jay Monahan, Panel Discussion To Bot or Not to Bot: The Implications ofSpider­
ing. 22 HAsTINGS CoMM. & ENT. LJ. 241,245 (2000). When the computer requests infor­
mation from another computer, the requesting computer must offer its IP address to the 
responding computer in order for a response to be sent. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061. If 
repeated requests come from a particular IP address, this can often signal robotic activity. 
ld. A responding computer that seeks to prohibit robots from accessing its site can then 
choose to ignore or "block" any further requests from that particular IP address. Id. How­
ever, this does not usually provide a long-term solution for the responding computer, as IP 
addresses can change on a daily basis and requesting computers can also route their re­
quests through other servers to appear as though these servers are the source of the origi­
nal request. ld. Additionally, blocking technology also carries a risk of denying requests 
from IP addresses that a responding ~omputer would actually want to serve. ld. 
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what is referred to as "recursive retrieving" or "automated brows­
ing."104 Once a web page is obtained from a particular website, the 
software robot reviews the page and then requests all other pages that 
are referenced therein.105 
This repetitive searching often imposes a burden on the re­
quested website's server exceeding that generated by an individual re­
viewing the very same pages of the website. 106 Website owners have 
argued that this additional burden could lead to decreased response 
time for "legitimate users," in other words, those users potentially in­
terested in purchasing goods or services, not those merely competing
107with the company. Furthermore, these website owners argue that 
consumption of the system's resources by these unwelcome users 
could eventually result in an overload that may cause the system to 
malfunction or "crash."108 If such a severe malfunction were to occur, 
data might be lost or service interrupted. 109 
However, in all of the cases brought to date, the burden created 
by these "illegitimate users" was minimal at bestY0 The websites were 
not affected in any appreciable way. The servers did not crash, and 
website users did not experience any noticeable delays in accessing 
the companies' web pages. 111 Furthermore, the software robots did 
not cause any actual damage to the servers necessitating system 
repairs. 112 
Thus, it appears that these owners of publicly accessible websites 
may be less concerned with actual harm to their computer system and 
more interested in finding a way to protect themselves from increased 
competition.113 However, competition is essential to protecting con­
104. O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570; Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion, The 
Web Robots Pages, at http:/ /www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 
2004). 
105. O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570. 
106. !d. 
107. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and 
Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1965, 1980 (2000). 
108. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061. 
109. !d. 
110. See, e.g., id. at 1063 (noting that while the defendant accessed the plaintiff's website 
100,000 times a day, that activity comprised at most 1.53% of the total number of requests); 
see also Kaplan, supra note 96 (discussing recent decisions in which courts found that plain· 
tiffs were not significantly burdened by the activities of software robots). 
Ill. Kaplan, supra note 96. 
112. !d. 
113. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc., Appellant, Supporting 
Reversal, at 6, eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. 
0().15995) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Law) ("[E)stablished online 
merchants have a substantial incentive .... to interfere with the flow of price and product 
334 MARYLAND LAw REVIEW [VoL. 63:320 
sumers.' 14 The public benefits from a marketplace that provides a 
variety of options. In fact, the U.S. government has recognized that 
maintaining the open architecture of the Internet is essential to fos­
tering valuable competition: 115 "Official decision makers must respect 
the unique nature of the medium and recognize that widespread com­
petition and increased consumer choice should be the defining fea­
ture of the new digital marketplace."116 
This is not to say that a website owner will never be able to show 
sufficient harm to outweigh the public benefit fostered by open access 
to information. Where a software robot actually causes a website to 
malfunction to such a degree that it is unable to serve its customers, a 
remedy may be appropriate.' 17 However, such exceptional claims 
should not be grounded in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, de­
spite the fact that they may fit within the literal language of the CFAA. 
v. ELEMENTS OF A CFAA CLAIM 
In order to bring a civil action under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, a party must be able to prove two main elements. First, a 
party must show that a defendant has engaged in prohibited con­
duct.'18 Second, a party must prove that it has suffered sufficient 
harm as defined by the Act. 119 Before discussing why recent decisions 
granting publicly available website owners proprietary rights in the ac­
cess to and use of factual information are not only inappropriate, but 
arguably unconstitutional, it is worth reviewing the basic requirements 
of a CFAA claim in more detail. 
A. Principal Statutory Provisions upon which Website Owners 

Base their Claims 

Owners of publicly available websites, who have attempted to pre­
vent their competitors from accessing and utilizing the non-copyright­
information on the Internet."); O'Rourke, supra note 107. at 1981 (noting that "[s]uch 
claims may have merit or may be asserted as a pretext to mask an anti-competitive intent") 
(footnote omitted). 
114. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Law at 3-4, eBay (No. 00-15995). 
115. !d. at 4. 
116. William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., Framework fur Global Electronic Commerce 2 Uuly 
I, 1997). available at http://dcc.syr.edu/ford/course/e<ommerce-framework.pdf. 
117. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Law at 13, eBay (No. 00-15995). "Trespass to 
chattels 'lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property 
has proximately caused injury." Id. (quoting Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. App. 2d 
468, 475 (1996)). 
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). 
119. Id. § 1030(g) (2000 & Supp. 2003),. 
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able information contained therein, have based their claims on a 
number of sections under the CFAA. Although the sections vary 
slightly, each section requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant 
accessed a computer without authorization or exceeded authorized 
access, which often becomes the primary focus in most CFAA cases. 120 
Nonetheless, section (a) (2) (C) appears to be the section that is most 
applicable in cases involving website owners trying to prohibit a com­
petitor from accessing and utilizing information posted on their In­
ternet site. 121 Additionally, it is probably one of the easiest sections 
under which to state a claim. 
The section prohibits a party from obtaining information by in­
tentionally accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding 
authorized access. 122 The CFAA does not provide a definition for "in­
formation." Despite the fact that the CFAA's legislative history sug­
gests that the statute is designed to protect confidential 
information, 123 as opposed to all other types of information, the statu­
tory language is not so limited. 124 Furthermore, courts, in their inter­
pretations of this provision, have not made such a distinction, but 
120. In an attempt to clarify the elements required to bring a civil action under the 
CFM the statute was amended in 2001 to provide that such an action could only be 
brought "if the conduct involves [one] of the factors set forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), 
or (v) of subsection (a) (5) (B) (i)." ld. At first glance this might appear to restrict civil 
actions to suits alleging violations of Section (5). However, a more careful reading of the 
statute reveals that this reference only seeks to incorporate expressly the requirement of 
..loss" (except in those cases that involve (1) "the modification or impairment, or potential 
modification or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment or care of 1 
or more individuals"; (2) "physical injury to any person"; (3) "a threat to public health or 
safety"; or (4) "damage affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity in 
furtherance of the administration ofjustice, national defense, or national security."). /d. 
§ 1030(a) (5.) (B). Furthermore, the Act provides that "[a]ny person who suffers damage or 
loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator 
to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief." !d. 
§ 1030(g). 
Additionally, there is nothing in the legislative history of the amendment to suggest 
that the drafters intended to limit civil actions to only those based on conduct prohibited 
by Section (5). Instead, the legislative history indicates that the change to Section (g) was 
made only to clarify the type of loss or harm required to maintain a civil action. 1'46 Co:\'G. 
REc. 510,916 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2000). 
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2) (C) (2000) (prohibiting unauthorized users from acquir­
ing information from protected computers in other states or countries). 
122. !d. § 1030(a) (2). 
123. See infra Part III (discussing references throughout the CFAA's legislative history 
implying that the statute is designed to protect confidential information). 
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c). The statute fails to state that the information must 
be confidential or privileged to be protecte~. ld. 
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instead have enjoined defendants from accessing non-copyrightable 
information freely available from plaintiffs' public websites. 125 
For example in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the plaintiff, Regis­
ter.com, Inc. (Register.com), sought a preliminary injunction prevent­
ing the defendant, Verio, Inc. (Verio), from accessing and utilizing 
the information contained on its website. 126 Register.com is a domain 
name registrar, providing customers the ability to register a name in 
the .com, .net., and .org top-level domains.127 As part of its obligation 
as an accredited domain name registrar, Register.com is required 
under its contract with the national accrediting agency to provide an 
online, interactive database containing the names, addresses, and 
phone numbers of all customers who register domain names through 
its services. 128 
In addition to its domain name registration services, Register.com 
offers a variety of other related services such as website creation tools, 
website hosting, and electronic maiJ.I 29 The defendant, Verio, is one 
of the largest operators of websites for businesses and a leading pro­
vider of Internet services. 130 Although Verio is not a domain name 
registrar, Register.com does compete directly with Verio to provide a 
variety of other Internet services, including website hosting and 
development. 131 
In order to target more effectively their marketing and sales ef­
forts, Verio wanted to find a way to recognize those entities in need of 
web hosting services.132 Companies that had recently registered a do­
125. See, e.g.. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238,255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
126. !d. at 241. 
127. /d. 
A domain name has two parts-a second-level domain and a top--level domain. 
The second-level domain consists of a term or series of terms, often a descriptive 
term,. a company•s name or a brand-name. Top-level domains indicate the type of 
organization that holds the address and include ".com" for commercial enter­
prises, ".edu" for educational enterprises, ".org" for non-profit and miscellaneous 
organizations, ...gov" for government sites, ".net" for networking providers, and 
".miJ'' for military information sites. 
Galbraith, supra note 99, at 851 (footnote omitted). 
128. Register. com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 241-42. In order to become an accredited do­
main name registrar, Register.com, like al1 registrars, was required to enter into a Registrar 
Accreditation Agreement (the Accreditation Agreement) with the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). !d. ICANN is a private, not-for-profit corpo­
ration that the U.S. Department of Commerce created to privatize the domain name sys­
tem. /d. at 242 n.l. The Accreditation Agreement sets out all of the responsibilities of a 
registrar and indudes the customer database requirement. /d. at 242. 
129. /d. at 241. 
130. !d. 
131. Id. 
132. !d. at 243. 
2004] IMPROPER UsE oF THE CoMPUTER FRAuD AND ABusE Acr 337 
main name would most likely fall into this category. 133 Therefore, 
Verio developed a software robot to access the contact information 
databases each accredited registrar made publicly available on its web­
site, including Register.com's Internet site. 134 The robot collected 
this information on a daily basis, allowing Verio to identify quickly 
potential customers for its services. 135 
Register.com objected to Verio's compilation and use of the con­
tact information appearing on its website.136 In an attempt to prevent 
the practice from continuing, Register.com sent Verio a letter request­
ing that it cease and desist its conduct.137 When Verio refused, Regis­
ter.com filed suit alleging that Verio's actions violated section 
(a) (2) (C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and moved for a 
preliminary injunction. 138 Register.com alleged that Verio's conduct 
had resulted in irreparable harm, including lost opportunities to sell 
additional, competing services to its domain name registrants. 139 
In granting the plaintiffs motion, the court did not analyze the 
nature of the information at issue. The court did not mention that 
the information on Register.com's website consisted merely of factual 
data, such as names and addresses/ 40 which is not protectable under 
copyright law. 141 Additionally, the court did not acknowledge that the 
data that Verio obtained had been posted by Register.com onto its 
publicly accessible Internet website.142 Instead, the court summarily 
held that Verio's software robots had acquired information from Reg­
ister.com's website, thus satisfying the specialized requirements of sec­
tion (a)(2)(C) of the CFAA.143 
133. /d. 
134. /d. 
135. /d. 
136. /d. at 244. 
137. !d. 
138. ld. Register.com also alleged that Verio's actions were prohibited by section 
(a) (5)(C) of the CFAA. ld. at 251. Additionally, Register.com claimed that Verio's con­
duct violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and asserted claims for trespass to chattels 
and breach of contract under the New York common law. !d. at 241. 
139. !d. at 248. 
140. /d. at 242 (noting that the information in the database consisted of customer 
names and contact information). 
141. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1990) (noting that 
facts cannot be copyrighted because they are not original creations). 
142. Regisler.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. at 242 (acknowledging that the information at issue 
was "freely accessible to the public" on Register.com's website). 
143. /d. at 252. The court also found that the plaintiff alleged sufficient damage as 
required by the CFAA and showed that the defendant's conduct was unauthorized as de­
fined by the statute. /d. 
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B. Defining Unauthi!T'ized Access 
A civil action plaintiff who alleges a violation of the CFAA will be 
required to prove that the defendant's access to its Internet site was 
either "without authorization" or "exceed[ed] authorized access."144 
This will generally be the case regardless of whether a plaintiff bases 
its claim under section (a) (2) (C) or some other section of the Act. 
The statute does not define "without authorization" and merely de­
fines "exceeds authorized access" as "access[ing] a computer with au­
thorization and [using] such access to obtain or alter information in 
the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter."w' 
Even more problematic, however, is the fact that the CFAA does not 
provide any limits on the types of activities that a party may deem to 
be "unauthorized" nor does it restrict the manner in which these 
prohibitions are communicated.146 
As a result, courts have granted website owners broad powers to 
exclude others from accessing and utilizing the information con­
tained on their publicly accessible websites. 147 These website owners 
have been given virtually unchecked discretion to define which acts 
constitute "unauthorized" conduct.148 Through contracts, the robot 
exclusion protocol,149 and direct communication, website owners 
have been remarkably successful in preventing visitors to their In­
temet sites from engaging in any conduct they deem undesirable. 150 
1. Mass-Market and Online "Contracts. "-Many publicly available 
websites contain "terms and conditions of use" to which all visitors 
that access the site are purportedly bound. 151 However, website visi­
tors are typically not required to indicate consent to these provi­
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (2000). 
145. !d. § 1030(e) (6). 
146. See generaUy id. § 1030(e). 
147. E.g., Register. com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 242-43, 253 (finding unauthorized access 
under the CFAA where the defendant violated the terms of the plaintiff's self-<:reated terms 
of use agreement). The court acknowledged "a movement away from nascent public regu· 
lation of the Internet and toward a consensus-based private ordering regime." /d. at 247. 
148. Cf. Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'! Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890,899 (N.D. 
Iowa 2001) (choosing not to address the statutory meaning of authorization and finding 
unauthorized access where the plaintiff's self-established "Terms of Service" were violated). 
149. See infra Part V (defining the "robot exclusion protocol" and how it recently has 
been utilized). 
150. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1073 (2000) (find­
ing unauthorized access where the defendant accessed facts in violation of the plaintiff's 
stated terms of use and Robot Exclusion Standard). 
151. Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. Lj. 475, 475 (2002). 
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sions.152 When such "approval" is necessary, it usually consists of a 
party clicking on a box marked "I Agree," oftentimes without even 
being presented with the numerous restrictions to which the user has 
apparently agreed. 153 
These provisions may prohibit a party from utilizing a software 
robot to gather data made publicly available by the owner of the web­
site,154 or they may restrict a visitor from copying uncopyrightable in­
formation for any sort of commercial purpose, despite the fact that 
the copyright laws would clearly allow the party to engage in such con­
duct.155 However, courts have not hesitated to enforce contracts of 
this nature. 156 
For example, in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the plaintiff website 
owner imposed conditions on the access to and end use of its domain 
name registrant contact information database.157 As discussed above, 
as part of its obligation as an accredited domain name registrar, Regis­
ter.com was required to provide to the public an online, interactive 
database containing the names, addresses, and phone numbers of all 
customers who register domain names through its services. 158 Be­
cause the data contained therein consisted solely of facts, the informa­
tion was not protectable under copyright law.159 Normally, this would 
allow a party to freely copy, utilize, and distribute this data. 160 
However, Register.com published terms and conditions gov­
erning the use of its domain name registrant database on the home 
page of its Internet website. 161 These provisions prohibited a party 
from using the contact information to engage in any commercial ad­
vertising or solicitations via direct mail, electronic mail, or by tele­
phone.162 Additionally, the terms provided that the user, by 
152. ld. 
153. !d. 
154. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dis­
cussing Register.com's terms and conditions for users, which prohibit the use of "high 
volume, automated, electronic processes that apply to Register.com"). 
155. See supra notes 3842 and accompanying text (explaining that copyright law does 
not protect facts because they do not meet the originality requirement). 
156. See, e.g., &gister.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 245-48 (granting Register.com an in­
junction based on its breach of contract claim). 
!57. !d. at 242-44. 
158. Id. at 241-42. 
159. See supra notes 38-56 (discussing the scope of copyright law). 
160. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,348 (1990) (noting that 
facts are uncopyrightable public information). 
161. R£gister.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. at 242-43. 
162. 	Id. at 242-43. The terms and conditions read as follows: 
By submitting a ... query, you agree that you will use this data only for lawful 
purposes and that under no circumstances wi!l you use this data to: (l) allow, 
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submitting a request for information from the database, agreed to be 
bound by the terms and conditions of use. 163 
Verio conceded that its use of the contact information for mar­
keting purposes conflicted with Register.com 's posted restrictions. 164 
However, Verio claimed that the terms and conditions were unen­
forceable, as it had never manifested assent to them. 165 Additionally, 
Verio argued that even under Register.com's policies, it was entitled 
to access the contact information database. 166 As such, Verio argued 
that its conduct could not be deemed "unauthorized" and, conse­
quently, it could not be in violation of the CFAA.167 
The court disagreed, finding that Verio was in fact bound by the 
terms and conditions posted by Register.com on its Internet site. 168 
The court began its discussion by acknowledging that "Register.com's 
terms of use are clearly posted on its website."169 Additionally, the 
court noted that the concluding paragraph of the terms and condi­
tions stated that "by submitting this query, you agree to abide by these 
terms."170 The court held that "in light of this sentence at the end of 
Register.com's terms of use, there can be no question that by proceed­
ing to submit a [request for information], Verio manifested its assent 
to be bound."171 The court found it irrelevant that Verio was not 
asked to click on an icon indicating that it accepted the terms, as 
Verio did not argue that it was unaware of them. 172 
The court ruled that because Verio had retrieved contact infor­
mation for the purpose of solicitation in violation of Register.com's 
posted policies, Verio had violated the CFAA.173 The court held that 
even ifVerio's initial access to the contact information database could 
enable, or otherwise support the transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial 
advertising or solicitations via direct mail, electronic mail, or by telephone; or (2) 
enable high volume, automated, electronic processes that apply to Register.com 
(or its syStems). The compilation, repackaging, dissemination or other Use of this 
data is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Register.com. 
Register.com reseiVes the right to modifY these tenns at any time. By submitting 
this query, you agree to abide by these terms. 
!d. 
163. !d. 
164. !d. at 245. 
165. !d. at 246. 
166. /d. at 252-53. 
167. It!. 
168. !d. at 248. 
169. Jd. 
170. /d. 
171. !d. 
172. /d. 
173. ld. at 252-53. 
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be classified as "authorized," such access would still be rendered "un­
authorized," because Verio knew that the data it obtained would be 
used for a purpose prohibited by the terms and conditions of Register. 
com's Internet site. 174 The court did not address the fact that the 
information at issue was uncopyrightable or that it had been made 
publicly available by Register.com. Instead, the court found that Reg­
ister.com was entitled to a preliminary injunction based upon its 
CFAA claim and ordered Verio to comply with all of Register.com's 
website policies. 175 
The enforcement of contracts protecting noncopyrightable infor­
mation, similar to the one at issue in Register.com has generated a sub­
stantial amount of controversy among academic commentators. 176 
Although a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, in 
part because contracts are only one of the methods by which website 
owners have been able to define unauthorized conduct under the 
CFAA, it is worth noting some of the predominate issues involved in 
this debate. These generally fall into the categories of assent, copy­
right preemption, and unconscionability. 
174. ld. at 253. 
175. Id. at 252-53, 255. The injunction provided, in relevant part, that Verio was prohib­
ited from engaging in the following activities: 
[1] Accessing Register.com's computers and computer networks in any man­
ner, including, but not limited to, by software programs perfonning multiple, 
automated, successive queries, provided that nothing in this Order shall prohibit 
Verio from accessing Register.com's WHOIS database in accordance with the 
terms and conditions thereof; and 
[2] Using auy data currently in Verio's possession, custody or control, that 
using its best efforts, Verio can identify as having been obtained from Register. 
com's computers and computer networks to enable the transmission of unsolic­
ited commercial electronic mail, telephone calls, or direct mail to the individuals 
listed in said data . . . . 
ld. at 255. 
176. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure 
of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 395-41 (1999) (discussing copyright law and the 
scope of the public domain); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated 
Intellectual Property Rights: &conciling Frtedom ofContract with Public Good Uses of Information, 
147 U. PA. L. REv. 875, 884-913 (1999) (examining the practice of contracting around 
federal intellectual property law); Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The &lation Be­
tween Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 827, 828-89 (1998) (ex­
ploring the relationship between contract and copyright law); Maureen A. O'Rourke, 
Copyright Pr-eemption AftcrtheProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 53, 
77-90 (1997) (discussing the competing interests involved in freedom of contract and preo­
ervation of the public domain). 
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a. Assent.-It is black letter law that in order for a contract 
to be enforceable, a party must have assented to its terms. 177 How­
ever, gone are the days when parties sit down and negotiate each and 
every tenn of an agreement. The vast majority of contracts today are 
standard fonn agreements. Courts have generally enforced these 
types of contracts, balancing the ideal of fully infonned assent against 
the realties of the marketplace in which obtaining such assent is pro­
hibitively expensive, particularly with mass-market transactions. 178 
However, commentators have expressed concern that actual as­
sent has become increasingly fictitious with some of the new forms of 
standardized agreements that have emerged in the marketplace. 179 It 
is difficult to see how a website visitor that has not provided any posi­
tive acceptance to the site's tenns and conditions can be deemed to 
have consented to them through the mere use of the Internet site. 180 
But recent court decisions have facilitated the enforcement of such 
contracts.181 Additionally, the passage of the Uniform Computer ln­
fonnation Transaction Act (UCITA) 182 by some state legislatures183 
has provided additional validation.184 
177. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2003). A contract"s existence depends on mutual intent to 
agree. !d. 
178. O"Rourke, supra note 18, at 623-24. 
179. See id. at 624-65 (noting that in the electronic context "not all users will read the 
tenns, making any assent less than fully informed"). 
180. See id. at 624 (encouraging the adoption of a rule requiring website operators, in 
order for their tenns of use to be enforceable, to provide the terms before allowing access 
to the website). 
181. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding 
arbitration clause in contract included with mail-order computer, despite the fact that the 
consumer could not view the agreement until after the item arrived); ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenbcrg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that software distributed with 
boilerplate license agreement, often called a "shinkwrap contract," is enforceable despite 
the fact that consumers cannot even view the contract until after the purcha.se has been 
made); M.A Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 315-16 (Wash. 
2000) (holding that an arbitration clause in a "shrink-wrap" licensing agreement was en­
forceable); Westendorfv. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369, at *5 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 16, 2000) (enforcing an arbitration provision contained within a standard form con­
tract accompanying a computer purchased by mail). 
182. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) is a model con­
tract law for software licenses and other computer information transactions. See Pamela 
Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, Huw Tensions Betwem Intellectual Property Policy and UCITA Are 
Likely to be Re.solved, in £CoMMERCE: STRATEGIES FOR SuccESs IN THE DIGITAL EcoNOI\1Y 741, 
746-53 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 1999) (providing an overview of UCITA). 
183. See, e.g., Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw I § 22-106 (2002) (adopting UCITA in 
Maryland). 
184. The provisions of UCITA have been heavily criticized for making it even easier for 
courts to find that a party has assented to contracrual provisions. See Samuelson & Opsahl, 
supra note 182, at 752-53 (noting that under UCITA contracts can be formed without a 
"signature, specific language or any specific con<;Juct," thereby significantly expanding the 
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b. Preemption.-Even if the assent hurdle is cleared, a web­
site owner seeking enforcement of a contract that provides protection 
beyond that granted by the Copyright Act may still face a preemption 
challenge. 185 Preemption may be statutorily or constitutionally 
based. 186 Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides that "all legal or 
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright ... are governed exclusively by" 
federal copyright law. 187 Therefore, a state law cause of action is pre­
empted by the Copyright Act if the rights asserted under it are 
"equivalent" to those protected by the Copyright Act, and the work 
involved falls within the "subject matter" protected by the Copyright 
Act. 188 To the extent a state law. contains an "extra element" not 
found in copyright law, courts generally will hold that the state law is 
not preempted by the Copyright Act. 189 
Many websites, including the one involved in Register. com contain 
terms and conditions that prohibit the use of all information con­
tained on the site for any sort of commercial purpose, including un­
copyrightable facts. 190 However; if the data at issue is not entitled to 
copyright protection, the Copyright Act allows the information to be 
freely copied and utilized for even commercial purposes. 191 By at­
tempting to restrict rights granted by the Copyright Act through con­
tract law, website owners are arguably displacing the carefully 
balanced provisions of the Copyright Act and, in its place, substituting 
their own privately legislated intellectual property laws. 192 As such, 
commentators have argued that enforcement under state law may be 
concept of assent). At the time of this writing, UCITA had been adopted by Maryland and 
Virginia, and legislation had been introduced in Arizona, Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire, 
New jersey, Oregon, Texas, and the District of Columbia. 
185. See, e.g., Koda!fek v. MTV Networks, Inc., I 52 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998)_(hold­
ing that the Copyright Act preempts state law where (1) the rights asserted by the plaintiff 
under state law are equivalent, and (2) the work in question is covered within the subject 
matter of the Copyright Act). 
186. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyber>pace: Drawing Burlier> in a Virtual Wurld, 82 
MI>JN. L. REv. 609, 694 (1998). 
187. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). 
188. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (cit­
ing Kodalkk, 152 F.3d at 1212). 
189. See Mayer v. josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (discussing the "extra element" test for preemption). 
190. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242-43 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (delineating the "fair use" policy). 
192. O'Rourke, supra note 186, at 694-97 (discussing the conflict between the use of 
contractual use-restriction provisions and the Copyrig_ht Act). 
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preempted to the extent that these contracts giVe website owners 
more rights than copyright law provides. 193 
However, courts have not been particularly receptive to this line 
of reasoning. 194 Instead courts have found that these contracts are 
not preempted because they contain an "extra element," namely the 
promises of each of the parties to the agreement. 195 In ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 196 the leading case on the subject of section 301 copyright 
preemption, the court distinguished contractual rights and copyright 
rights by stating that "[c]ontracts ... generally affect only their par­
ties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create exclu­
sive rights."197 
But even if a contractual provision survives section 301 preemp­
tion, it still may be constitutionally preempted.198 A contractual term 
may be constitutionally preempted if its enforcement would "stand as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress" in enacting a particular statute.199 Website owners fre­
quently include a provision in the terms and conditions that any use 
of software robots to gather information on the Internet site is prohib­
ited.200 There is no copyright right to employ software robots, there­
fore, relinquishing one's ability to use one would not implicate an 
"equivalent right."201 However, enforcement of the prohibition would 
remove a method by which a website visitor could exercise its right to 
copy uncopyrightable information.202 The fact that the website owner 
would alternatively allow the Internet site's content to be manually 
193. See id. at 687 (noting that in the Internet context "[b]oilerplate notices against 
linking may be ... preempted by federal copyright law"); Elkin-Karen, supra note 12, at 
200 ("A license that restricts use of (otherwise unprotected) information could be pre­
empted under copyright law.") (footnote omitted). 
194. See Hill v. yateway 2000, Inc.. 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (ho\ding that 
purchasers were bound by a contract not seen until they opened the box containing their 
purchase); see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that contractual provisions were not preempted by the Copyright Act). 
195. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454-55. 
196. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
197. /d. at 1454 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
198. See O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 626 (discussing the application of constitutional 
preemption). 
199. /d. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
200. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 (discussing 
eBay's "User Agreement"). 
201. O'Rourke, supra note 107, at 2000. The Copyright Act protects rights that are 
"equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright." 17 U.S.C. 
§ 301 (a) (2000). 
202. O'Rourke, supra note 107, at 2000. 
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indexed may not necessarily save the software robot restriction from 
preemption.203 
c. Unconscionability.-Another potential argument for the 
invalidation of restrictions such as those found in Register. com is that 
they are unconscionable. Traditionally, a term is defined as "uncon­
scionable" if it is unduly harsh, commercially unreasonable, or grossly 
unfair given the existing circumstances?04 However, some commen­
tators have suggested a more refined "public-interest unconscionabil­
ity" doctrine in which standard form contracts that contain terms that 
impede competition or undermine present or future public-interest 
uses of information should not be enforced.205 Terms and conditions 
that prevent software robots from accessing and utilizing non-copy­
rightable information may satisfY either test of unconscionability.206 
Requiring all website visitors to consent to such a prohibition before 
being permitted to access or use otherwise unprotectable information 
arguably rises to the level of being "unduly harsh" or "commercially 
unreasonable. "207 This is due to the fact that these types of contrac­
tual restrictions look less like a means of protecting a website owner's 
Intemet site and more like an attempt to prevent competition.208 Fur­
thermore, as competition is essential to protecting consumers,209 en­
forcement of a contractual provision that hinders it is not in the 
public's best interest.210 
2. "Traditional" Contracts.-It is not just mass market licenses 
that have formed the basis for CFAA claims. In EF Cultural Travel BV 
v. Explorica, Inc., 211 the First Circuit held that an employee's confiden­
203. /d. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Cralt Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160, 167 
(1989)). The Bonito Court held that a Florida statute prohibiting one method of duplicat­
ing boat hulls was preempted by the federal Patent AcL Bonito, 489 U.S. at 168. 
204. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1524-25 (6th ed. 1990) (defining unconscionability as a 
"doctrine under which courts may deny enforcement of unfair or oppressive contracts"); 
see also Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (applying the doctrine of 
unconscionability to a contract for the sale of chattels). 
205. See, e.g., Reichman & Franklin, supra note 176, at 929-32 (proposing the doctrine of 
public-interest unconscionability). 
206. See id. at 931 (explaining that contract tenns that unreasonably deviate from com­
mercially accepted practices are unconscionable). 
207. O'Rourke, supra note 107, at 2000. 
208. See id. (stating that " [ t) he blanket exclusion of spiders employed by shopbots may 
hamper competition by restricting the flow of pricing information"). 
209. See supra Part IV (discussing consumer benefits from competition). 
210. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 182 (asserting that" [a] noncompetitive market of 
virtual gatekeepers could compromise open access and cause inefficiencies in electronic 
commerce"). 
211. 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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tiality agreement defined the contours of "authorized" conduct for 
the purposes of a CFAA action. 212 However, as discussed below, the 
court's decision appears to be erroneous. 
The plaintiff, EF Cultural Travel BV (EF), has been in business 
for more than thirty-five years and is the world's largest private stu­
dent travel organization.213 In early 2000, the defendant, Explorica, 
Inc. (Explorica), was formed and began to compete with EF in the 
field of global tours for high school students.214 Several of EF's for­
mer employees were hired by Explorica, including Philip Gormley, 
the former vice president of information strategy at EF, who became 
the vice president of Explorica.215 
Gormley believed that the best way to compete with EF would be 
to charge less for equivalent travel packages.216 In order to do this, 
Gormley needed to obtain the prices for each of EF's tours.217 
Gormley considered several ways to obtain EF's prices, but ultimately 
decided that the most efficient method would be to use a software 
robot to gather the non-copyrightable information from EF's publicly 
accessible website.218 Explorica hired its Internet consultant to design 
the program and then used the program twice, first to retrieve the 
2000 tour prices and then the 2001 prices.219 EF did not, however, 
suffer any computer slowdowns or loss of data as a result of Explor­
ica's robotic activity.220 
Upon learning of Explorica's actions,221 EF filed suit against Ex­
plorica alleging violations of the CFAA and sought a preliminary in­
junction barring Explorica from using its software robot on EF's 
website.222 The district court granted the injunction on the grounds 
that the manner in which Explorica accessed EF's website was "unau­
thorized," as it likely violated a confidentiality agreement between 
212. ld. at 583-85. · 
213. !d. at 579. 
214. !d. 
215. Id. 
216. ld. 
217. !d. 
218. Id. Gormley also considered the following methods of gathering EF's prices: (I) 
"[M]anually keying in the information from EF's brochures and other printed materials; 
[ (2)] ... [U]sing a scanner to record the information; [ (3}] ... [M]anually searching ... 
EF"s website" for the price of each tour offered by EF. ld. 
219. !d. at 579-80. 
220. !d. at 584. 
221. The court noted that "[t]he development arid use of the scraper [Explorica"s 
software robot] came to light about a year and a half later during [unre1ated] state--court 
litigation." /d. at 580. 
222. !d. 
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Gormley and EF.223 Explorica appealed the decision to the First 
Circuit.224 
In affirming the district court's decision, the appellate court first 
reviewed the terms of the confidentiality agreement at issue.225 The 
agreement provided that Gormley was not to disclose or use any "Con­
fidential or Proprietary Information."226 This term was defined as 
"any trade or business secrets or confidential information of EF" or 
"any technical, business, or financial information, the use or disclo­
sure of which might reasonably be construed to be contrary to the 
interests of EF."227 The court held that the record contained two 
communications from Gormley to Explorica's Internet consultant that 
"seem[ed] to rely on information about EF to which he was privy only 
because of his employment there."228 
First, the court pointed to an e-mail from Gormley to the Internet 
consultant in which he inquired if a member of the company could 
write a software robot program and also stated that he would be availa­
ble to work with whomever would design it.229 The second communi­
cation consisted of another e-mail from Gormley to the Internet 
consultant providing a link to the webpage on EF's publicly accessible 
Internet site that contained an interactive database that a website visi­
tor could use to obtain EF's tour prices.230 The information gathered 
223. ld. at 580-82. Incredibly, the district court also held that EF's use of a copyright 
symbol on one of the pages of its website, along with a link directing users with questions to 
contact the company, provided notification that use of a software robot was unauthorized. 
fd_ at 580. The district court stated that it furnished a "clear statement [that] should have 
dispelled any notion a reasonable person may have had that the 'presumption of open 
access' applied to information on EF's website." ld. On appeal, the First Circuit did not 
review this basis for finding that Explorica had engaged in "unauthorized" conduct in vio­
lation of the CFAA ld. at 582. 
Additionally, the appellate court did not review the district court's finding that EF 
utilized "technical restraints" to notify Explorica that software robots were prohibited on 
EF's Internet site. /d. The opinion does not specify the types of "technical restraints" EF 
used, but this most likely included use of the software robot exclusion protocol. See infra 
Part V (providing a discussion of the use of this mechanism). 
224. EF Cultural Travel BV, 274 F.3d at 578. 
225. ld. at 582. 
226. !d. 
227. ld_ 
228. fd_ 
229. ld. The e-mail stated: "[m]ight one of the team be able to write a program to 
automatically extract prices ... ? I could work with him/her on the specification." /d. 
230. ld. Gormley's e-mail provided as follows: 
Here is a link to the page where you can grab EF's prices. There are two impor­
tant drop down menus on the right .... \Vith the lowest one you select one of 
about 150 tours.*** You then select your origin gateway from a list of about 100 
domestic gateways (middle drop down menu). \Vhen you select your origin gate­
way a page with a couple of tables comes up. One table. has 1999·2000 prices and 
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from this page included various tour codes, which EF claimed were 
confidential.231 
The court held that these e-mails provided "ample evidence that 
Gormley provided Explorica proprietary information about the struc­
ture of the website and the tour codes" despite the court's acknowl­
edgement that "gathering manually the various codes through 
repeated searching and deciphering of the URLs232 theoretically may 
be possible."233 According to the court, further evidence that the tour 
codes were confidential was illustrated by the fact that "[a]n unin­
formed reader would regard the tour codes as nothing but gibber­
ish."234 Moreover, the court noted that "[a]lthough the codes can be 
correlated to the actual tours and destination points, the codes stand­
ing alone need to be 'translated' to be meaningfu1."235 The court 
concluded by finding that "Explorica's wholesale use of EF's travel 
codes to facilitate gathering EF's prices from its website reeks of use­
and indeed, abuse-of proprietary information that goes beyond any 
authorized use of EF's website."236 As such, the court held that Ex­
plorica's actions were "unauthorized" and that the district court's issu­
237ance of an injunction for violation of the CFAA was proper.
The court's reasoning in this case appears to be misguided. De­
spite the court's conclusion that Gormley transferred proprietary in­
formation to its Internet consultant,238 it seems that Gormley 
provided nothing more than the Internet address on which the pub­
licly available database was located and instructions for its use. 239 This 
certainly does not resemble the type of information that only an em-
the other has 200{}-2001 prices. * * * On a high speed connection it is possible to 
move quickly from one price table to the next by hitting backspace and then the 
down arrow. 
Id. 
231. Id. 
232. URL is the acronym for "uniform resource locator," the global address of docu­
ments and other resources on the Internet. Id. at 583 n.l3. For example, the URL for 
book-seller Barnes and Noble's website home page is "http://barnesandnoble.com," while 
the URL for the page listing the results of a search for all books on "computer hacking" is: 
http: I I search. barnesandnoble .com/booksearch/ results.asp?WRD=computer+ hacking& 
userid=**********" (author's actual ten digit user identification number removed from 
URL and replaced with asterisks). 
233. Id. at 583. 
234. Id. 
235. ld. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 58~4. 
238. Id. at 583. 
239. Id. at 582 (referring to the e-mail from Gormley to Explorica's Internet consultant 
in which Gormley provided the link to EF's prices). 
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ployee of EF would be privy to, instead it would appear that any indi­
vidual who was remotely computer savvy could locate EF's publicly 
available tour price database on its Internet site and navigate through 
it to obtain the cost of each tour without much difficulty.240 
Additionally, the fact that the average website visitor would not 
make use of the tour codes provided on the website,241 does not trans­
form this uncopyrightable data into proprietary information. Al­
though Gormley may have been better able to organize and utilize the 
tour price information gathered from EF's website with knowledge of 
the tour codes, nothing in the opinion indicates that these codes or 
the tour prices were not available to members of the general public. 
It would therefore seem difficult to characterize this information as 
"confidential" or "proprietary." 
It appears that EF's CFAA claim was a thinly veiled attempt to 
prevent legitimate competition.242 Explorica's software robots were 
unwelcome visitors, not because they caused harm to EF's computer 
system, but because the information they gathered allowed Explorica 
to compete more effectively against EF in the high school global tours 
market.243 It is hard to see how utilizing that which looks like publicly 
accessible information runs afoul of Gormley's employment agree­
ment.244 It seems that the only real injury EF may have suffered as a 
result of Explorica's conduct was harm to its bottom line. 
3. Robot Exclusion ProtocoL-As discussed above, although a 
software robot utilizes the same web protocols as an individual in ini­
tially accessing information from an Internet site, they gather informa­
245tion from a website in a different manner. As a result, while all 
"traditional" visitors to a website may be asked to click "I Agree" to an 
Internet site's terms and conditions, a software robot's presence may 
not activate such a request from the website.246 Further complicating 
matters for a website 'owner seeking to prohibit software robots from' 
accessing and utilizing information from its Internet site, a software 
240. See id. at 579 (noting that tour information could be acquired by manually search­
ing EF's website). 
241. /d. at 583. 
242. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 181-82 (drawing similar conclusions about eBay's 
CFAA claim in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). 
243. See id. (noting that the plaintiff in eBay was similarly motivated to "preserve its domi· 
nance in the online auction industry ..). 
244. See EF Cultural Travel BV, 274 F.2d at 582-83 (describing the information accessed 
by Gormley and the terms of the confidentiality agreement between Gormley and EF). 
245. See supra Part IV; see also O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570.71 (describing the use of 
automated software tools to extract data). 
246. O'Rourke, supra note 18, at 570.71. 
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robot may never actually view the webpage that contains the Internet 
site's prohibitions against these electronic agents. 247 
Most software robots will, however, see a specially formulated "ro­
bots. txt" file upon accessing a website.248 This document provides di­
rectives indicating which parts of the Internet site the owner does not 
want the robot visiting and is known as the "Robot Exclusion Proto­
col."249 But nothing prevents a software robot from ignoring these 
instructions and crawling the entire site.250 In fact, the Robot Exclu­
sion Protocol creators designed it to be a voluntary standard.251 
Regardless, it appears courts may be inclined to give the protocol 
legal effect.252 In eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., the court held that 
eBay "explicitly notifies automated visitors that their access is not per­
mitted."253 The coun noted that eBay utilized the Robot Exclusion 
Protocol to inform software robots that access to its website was unau­
thorized.254 Although the court's decision was in the context of a tres­
passing claim, it would seem that this same analysis would be 
applicable to eBay's CFAA claim as well. 25-' 
Once again, however, enforcement of the Robot Exclusion Proto­
col gives the website owner the power to exclude anyone from its In­
ternet site that it deems undesirable.256 There is no requirement that 
the protocol be drafted in such a way to limit its application to robotic 
activity that could cause actual damage to a computer system.257 In­
stead, it can be used to prevent software robots from accessing and 
247. ld. at 572-73. 
248. Koster, supra note 104. Koster helped develop the Robot Exclusion Protocol and 
maintains it to this day. Luh, supra note 98. 
249. Koster, supra note 104. 
250. ld.; Luh, supra note 98. 
251. Koster, supra note 104. 
252. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 
2000); see also EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 580-81 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(discussing the district court's decision to issue a preliminary injunction on a CFAA claim 
based in part on its finding that the defendant had "bypassed technical restrictions embed­
ded in the website"-most likely referring to the Robot Exclusion Protocol). 
253. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. 
254. ld. at 1061. 
255. ld.; see also Dan L. Burk, The Trouhli! with Trespass, 4]. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 
28-32 (2000) (discussing courts' me of the trespass cause of action in disputes over com­
puter and Internet access). 
256. Luh, supra note 98 (stating that the "Robot Exclusion [Protocol] ... lets Web site 
owners tell robots where to go and where not to go on their sites"). 
257. See id. (noting that the Robot Exclusion Standard is not really a "standard," as it is 
not mandatory). 
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utilizing factual information on an Internet site that is not otherwise 
protectable, to the detriment of the general public.258 
4. Direct Communication.-A website owner seeking to control ac­
cess to and the use of information on its Internet site is not limited to 
contracts or use of the Robot Exclusion Protocol to notify software 
robots that they are unwelcome.259 Courts have held that website 
owners can use ·a number of more direct methods to notify a specific 
party that their electronic data gathering is not permitted.260 For ex­
ample, in eBay, the court found that eBay had contacted defendant 
Bidder's Edge by telephone and letter demanding that it cease any 
further robotic activity. 261 The court held that it was therefore irrele­
vant that Bidder's Edge may not have assented to the terms and condi­
tions of eBay's website that prohibited the use of software robots, as 
Bidder's Edge had been "repeatedly and explicitly notified [that] its 
use of eBay's computer system was unauthorized."262 
Additionally, in Register. com, Inc. u. Verio, Inc., the court ruled that 
Register.com's Internet site's terms of use may not have specifically 
forbidden the use of search robots.263 However, the court still held 
that Verio had been notified that such use was prohibited.264 The 
court found that it was "clear since at least the date this lawsuit was 
filed that Register.com d[id] not consent to Verio's use of a search 
robot," and that Verio was "on notice that its search robot [was] un­
welcome."265 The court ruled that "Verio's future use of a search 
robot to access the database exceed[ed] the scope of Register.com's 
consent" and would be unauthorized.266 As such, the court issued an 
injunction on Register.com's CFAA claim, prohibiting Verio from ac­
258. See id. (citing an industry expert who argues that use of the Robot Exclusion stan­
dard as a "no trespassing sign" could chill the free flow of information on the lnternet). 
259. See, e.g., eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (referring to eBay's contacting of Bid­
der's Edge by phone and by letter to notify it that robot use was prohibited on eBay's 
website). 
260. See id. 
261. /d. at 1062. 
262. /d. at 1068, 1070. 
263. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Regis­
ter.com's terms and conditions required a party utilizing its contact information database 
to agree that it would not "use this data to ... enable high volume, automated, electronic 
processes that apply to Register.com (or its systems)." The court also found that 
"(a]lthough Verio uses an automated process to collect the ... data it does not then use 
the collected data to enable an automated process[.]" /d. (emphasis omitted). Instead, 
.. [o]nce Verio's software robot secures the ... information from Register.com's systems, it 
has completed its automated process with respect to Register.com's systems." /d. 
264. /d. 
265. /d. 
266. /d. at 249, 251. 
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cessing its publicly accessible online database by means of a software 
robot.267 
C. "Loss" 
A civil action plaintiff stating a CFAA claim must not only be able 
to prove that a defendant has engaged in prohibited conduct, but 
must also prove that it has suffered sufficient harm.268 Under the 
CFAA, a plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant's conduct 
has resulted in a Joss of $5000 by the plaintiff.269 Prior to the 2001 
USA Patriot Act amendments, however, there was some uncertainty as 
to when the statutory minimum was applicable and how it should be 
calculated.270 This was due in large part to a combination of organiza­
tional problems and statutory ambiguities inherent in prior versions 
of the CFAA.271 
Earlier versions of the Act provided that in order to bring a civil 
action, a plaintiff must have suffered "damage or loss."272 The CFAA 
defined "damage" as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of 
data, a program, a system, or information" that causes loss aggregating 
at least $5000 in value during any one-year period to one or more 
individuals.273 However, the term "Joss" was not defined. 
267. !d. at 252. 
268. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003) (requiring CFAA plaintiff to demon­
strate loss of at least $5000). 
269. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (Supp. 2003). Section (g) provides in part: "A civil action for a 
violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set 
forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection (a) (5) (B)." /d. Section (a) (5) (B) 
(i) provides: "loss to 1 or more persons during any !-year period (and, for purposes of an 
investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss 
resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers) 
aggregating at least $5,000 in value." /d.§ 1030(a)(5)(B)(i). 
270. See infra notes 274-288 (discussing cases in whicl) courts construed the meaning of 
"loss" under the CF AA). 
271. See, e.g., Andreano, supra note 65, at 86 (discussing problems associated with the 
1984 CFAA). 
272. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (1994 & Supp. 1996) ("Any person who suffers damage or loss 
by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to 
obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief."). 
273. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (8) (A) (1994). The term damage was also defined as "any im­
pairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information, that­
(B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs, the medical examina­
tion, diagnosis, treaunent, or care of one or more individuals; 
(C) causes physical injury to any person; or 
(D) threatens public health or safety." 
/d. § l030(e)(8)(b)-(d). 
However, in the context of website owners attempting to prevent their competitors 
from accessing and utilizing information contained on their Internet sites, only Section 
. . 
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As a result, a number of cases arose regarding the issue of 
whether the $5000 statutory minimum applied to "loss" or only "dam­
age."274 Civil action plaintiffs argued that, although the $5000 thresh­
old may be applicable to cases involving "damage," a party who has 
suffered "loss" should not be required to prove that it met the statu­
tory minimum.275 Most courts, however, were not receptive to this 
line of reasoning, and held that the $5000 statutory minimum applied 
to civil actions regardless of whether the harm was pled as "loss" or 
"damage."276 
Prior to the 2001 amendments, courts also struggled with deter­
mining the types of harm that could be included in calculating the 
$5000 statutory minimum. For example, could the costs of investigat­
ing any possible harm caused by a defendant's conduct be included? 
Additionally, what about computer time lost by a plaintiff as a result of 
repairs needed because of a defendant's actions? Or were only the 
costs specified in the definition of "damage" allowed, namely, expend­
itures directly related to any impairment to the actual computer sys­
tem or the availability of data? 
Courts faced with this issue differed widely over the types of harm 
that could be included in determining whether the monetary thresh­
old had been met.277 Others avoided this statutory ambiguity by ar­
(A) ("causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during any !-year period to one or 
more individuals") is applicable. See id. § 1030(e)(8)(A). 
274. See infra notes 275-276 and accompanying text (outlining cases demonstrating this 
conflict). 
275. See, e.g., In re DoubleC!ick Inc. Privacy Litig., !54 F. Supp. 2d 497, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (noting the plaintiffs argument that "loss" is distinct from "damage" under 
§ 1030(g)). 
276. See id. at 522 (holding that any loss actionable under the CFM is subject to the 
Act's damage minimum); Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1159 (W.D. 
Wash. 2001) (finding that the statute is ambiguous on the [ssue of whether loss is subject to 
the $5000 statutory minimum, but that the context of the statute requires an inclusion of 
"loss" within the harm threshold); Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d 
667, 678 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that the $5000 statutory minimum is applicable regard­
less of whether harm is pled as "loss" or "damage"); In reintuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 
2d 1272, 1281 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that in order to bring a civil action, a plaintiff must 
suffer "damage" as defined under the Act and interpreting "loss" to mean irreparable 
damage). 
277. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 584.85 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(holding that diagnostic measures taken by the plaintiff to assess the defendant's access to 
its website could be included in calculating the $5000 statutory threshold); In re Intui~ 138 
F. Supp. 2d at 1281 (declaring that the definition of loss is limited to "irreparable damage" 
and that a more expansive definition would render the tenn "damage" superlluous); In re 
DoubleClick Inc., !54 F. Supp. 2d at 521-22 (citing legislative history for support of its deci· 
sian that "loss" can include more than just the cost of actual repairs to a computer system); 
Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126-27 
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (adopti~g an expansive definition of "loss" to meet the monetary 
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guably stretching the logical boundaries of the facts and law in order 
to find that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient "damage" as defined by 
the Act, namely, harm to computer data or the system itself.278 For 
example, as discussed above, in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the 
plaintiff website owner brought suit against one of its competitors for 
utilizing a software robot to collect non-copyrightable data contained 
on its publicly accessible website. 279 The defendant's conduct did not, 
however, cause the plaintiff's system to shutdown or result in the cor­
ruption of any data.280 
In an attempt to prove that the $5000 threshold had been met, 
the plaintiff submitted the declaration of its Vice President for Tech­
nology, Robert Gardos, who estimated that the defendant's activities 
had resulted in the diminishment of 2.3% of the plaintiff's system re­
sources. 281 But during discovery, it was determined that the plaintiff's 
Vice President had not taken measurements of either the capacity of 
the plaintiff's computer system or the portion of that capacity that was 
consumed by the defendant's search robots.282 Instead, the plaintiff's 
Vice President admitted that the numbers he used were "all rough 
estimates" in arriving at his conclusion that the defendant's search 
robots occupied a certain percentage of the plaintiff's system 
capacity.283 
Despite the court's acknowledgement that the plaintiff's vice 
president's estimations had been "thoroughly undercut,"284 the court 
still found that the $5000 threshold had been met. 285 The court 
stated that "[z]fthe strain on [the plaintiff's] resources generated by 
robotic searches becomes large enough, it could cause [the plaintiff's] 
computer systems to malfunction or crash. Such a crash would satisfY 
[the CFAA's] threshold requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate 
$5000 in economic damages."286 Based on this mere possibility of fu­
ture harm, the court determined that the plaintiff had satisfied the 
threshold); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., I26 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252 n.l2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(holding that lost goodwill or business could be included in calculation of the statutory 
minimum absent the impairment or unavailability of data or systems). 
278. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc., I26 F. Supp. 2d at 252 (noting that harm based on the 
potential for future harm can be included in the calculation of damages under § I030(g)). 
279. !d. at 243-44. 
280. !d. at 249-50. 
281. !d. at 249. 
282. Id. at 249-50. 
283. !d. 
284. ld. at 249. 
285. !d. at 252. 
286. !d. (emphasis added). 
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statutory minimum level of damage necessary for a CFAA claim.287 
The court went on to issue an injunction that prohibited the defen­
dant's software robots from searching the plaintiff's publicly accessible 
website.288 
The 2001 amendments to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
did not remove the $5000 threshold, but instead arguably made it eas­
ier to meet.289 The usA Patriot Act290 resolved the statutory ambigu­
ity that had perplexed the courts regarding how the statutory 
minimum should be calculated by defining "loss" and providing that 
all loss should be included in determining whether the statutory mini­
mum is met. 291 Currently, the CFAA defines loss as "any reasonable 
287. ld. 
288. ld. 
289. The 2001 amendments made clear that all parties bringing a civil action must 
prove that they suffered a $5000 loss except in those cases that involve (I) "the modifica­
tion or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical examination, 
diagnosis, treatment, or care of I or more individuals"; [2] .. physical injury to any person"; 
[3] "a threat to public health or safety"; or (4) "damage affecting a computer system used 
by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration ofjustice, national de­
fense, or national security." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5) (B)(ii)-(iv) (Supp. 2003). None of 
these exceptions, however, are generally applicable to a case involving a website owner 
attempting to prevent parties from accessing and utilizing information contained on its 
Internet site. 
290. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001). 
291. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814, Jl5 Stat. at 382; 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. 2003). It 
should be noted that the 2001 amendments resolved another statutory ambiguity related to 
the statutory threshold, namely, whether the $5000 minimum could be satisfied through a 
related course of conduct, rather than a single act. The issue arose in a series of class 
action suits with courts differing in how the CFAA should be interpreted. See Hayes v. 
Packard Bell NEC, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 910,912 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that the CFAA 
required an allegation that the defect caused $5000 worth of damage to each protected 
computer, not $5000 in the aggregate); Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F. 
Supp. 2d 667, 678 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (determining that in order for the statutory minimum 
to be met, at least one member of the plai~tiff class must have suffered $5000 in damage, 
and if so, any other individual who suffered damage may bring a claim, even if his or her 
own damage is less than $5000); ln re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 
523 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the CFAA only allows damages and losses to "be aggre­
gated across victims and over time for a single act"); ln reToys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 
C-00-2746, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001) (holding that each 
plaintiff did not have to suffer damage of $5000 to meet the statutory threshold and that 
losses caused by the same type of act by the defendant may be aggregated); ln reAm. 
Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (ruling that $5000 statutory 
threshold can be aggregated among the various members of the plaintiff class). 
The USA Patriot Act amended the CFAA to provide that the $5000 damage threshold 
is satisfied through loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting one or more 
protected computers for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding 
brought by the United States only. 18 U.S.C. § l030(a) (5) (B) (i) (Supp. 2003). The impli­
cation therefore appears to be that a single act, not a related course of conduct, must be 
alleged by an individual bringing a civil action, as opposed to the government, in order to 
meet the statutory loss requirement. 
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cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, con­
ducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, sys­
tem, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any 
revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred 
because of interruption of service."292 The legislative history evinces 
Congress's intent behind the expansive definition was to ensure that a 
court considers all of a hacking victim's losses when determining 
whether the $5000 minimum is satisfied.293 
As a result, the owner of a publicly available website that wants to 
completely bar its competitors from accessing and utilizing the infor­
mation contained therein, no longer has to sit by and hope that its 
claim will be heard by a judge willing to engage in the same analysis 
that the Register.com court employed. Instead, website owners them­
selves can ensure that they have fulfilled the $5000 statutory thresh­
old. All a website owner need do is to hire a firm to conduct a 
"damage assessment" following detection of robotic activity.294 As the 
statute expressly provides that all charges related to such an assess­
ment are to be included in computing the minimum harm required 
to bring a civil suit, 295 the website owner will easily satisfy the first ele­
ment of a civil claim under the CFAA regardless of whether the 
software robot caused any appreciable harm to its computer system.296 
The requirement of harm under the CFAA has therefore become vir­
tually non-existent. For this very reason, a CFAA claim becomes more 
attractive to website owners than most other types of claims brought 
against their competitors, including trespass to chattels. 297 
292. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(ll) (Supp. 2003). 
293. 146 GoNG. REc. 510,913, 510,916 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
294. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (11) (Supp. 2003) (including among the items that consti­
tute a "loss" reasonable costs in conducti_ng damage assessments). This assumes of course 
that the damage assessment costs at least $5000. It would appear, however, that this would 
more than likely be the case. 
295. !d. 
296. !d.; see also supra note 293 and accompanying text (noting that the legislative history 
of the CFAA indicates an intent to include the full costs to the victim within the definition 
of "loss"). 
297. Over the past few years, the venerable doctrine of trespass has been given new life 
in modem cyberspace cases. For example, in eBay, Inc. v. BidderS Edge, Inc., the plaintiff, 
eBay brought suit against Bidder's Edge for using a software robot to access and gather 
information contained on the plaintiff's Internet site. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000). eBay operates a publicly accessible auction website where sellers of merchan­
dise list their wares online and the items are then sold to the highest bidder. ld. 
The defendant, Bidder's Edge, does not provide online auction services in direct com­
petition \\rith eBay, but instead competes indirectly as an online auction aggregator. /d. at 
1061. Bidder's Edge allows an individual interested in locating information about auctions 
for a particular type of item to quickly search numerous online auction sites in a single 
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VI. PRNATE PROPERlY RIGHTS IN INFORMATION 
As the discussion above illustrates, the two elements of a civil ac­
tion claim-prohibited conduct and loss-rarely pose much of a hur­
dle for a website owner who seeks to prevent its competitors from 
accessing and utilizing noncopyrightable information contained on its 
website. In many ways, it is even easier for a civil action plaintiff to 
prove that the defendant has violated the CFAA's prohibitions than to 
prove loss, as plaintiffs have been given surprisingly wide latitude in 
defining that which constitutes permissible conduct on their web-
search, as opposed to performing a separate search on the website of each online auction 
company. ld. at 1061-62. For example, if someone were interested in bidding on a Sammy 
Sosa baseball card, he or she would want to find out where such auctions were occurring, 
and more likely than not, the current bid on the baseball card. This data could be ob­
tained by visiting the home page of every online auction site and conducting a search on 
each one, or by simply conducting one search on the Bidder's Edge site to find out the very 
same information. ld. at 1062. 
Bidder's Edge uses software robots to compile the data from individual online auction 
companies, including the information on eBay's website. /d. One may wonder why eBay 
would object to the additional exposure that a site like Bidder's Edge may bring to eBay's 
own auctions. The simple fact is that even though eBay may get some publicity, Bidder's 
Edge also provides information on eBay's direct competitors, potentially informing a con­
sumer about a better deal. /d. 
Another reason why eBay disapproved of Bidder's Edge's use of software robots on its 
site is that eBay had been attempting to license such a right to crawl its website to others. 
Id. In fact, prior to filing the lawsuit, eBay and Bidder's Edge had been engaged in licens­
ing negotiations. /d. eBay had even consented to Bidder's Edge's robotic activity while 
negotiations for a fonnal licensing agreement were underway. ld. When, however, the 
negotiations failed to result in an agreement, Bidder's Edge refused to stop crawling eBay's 
site. /d. Soon thereafter, eBay filed suit against Bidder's Edge alleging a variety of state 
and federal claims, including common law trespass to chattels and a violation of the CFAA. 
ld. eBay then moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting Bidder's Edge from acces­
sing its Internet site, to which the court noted that "eBay's motion appears to be, in part, a 
tactical effort to increase the strength of its license negotiation position and not just a 
genuine effort to prevent irreparable harm." Id. at 1064 n.9. 
Despite this fact, the court granted the injunction, ruling only on the trespass claim. 
Id. In order to prevail on the trespass to chattels claim, eBay had to prove that Bidder's 
Edge had intentionally interfered with eBay's possessory interest in the computer system, 
and that such conduct had proximately caused damage. /d. at 1069-70. However, eBay's 
computer system had not been harmed in any way by Bidder's Edge's robotic activity. Id. at 
1064-65. There was no evidence that eBay had suffered any loss of data or that it had 
experienced any system crashes or slowdowns. /d. 
But the court surprisingly still found that the element of harm had been satisfactorily 
demonstrated by eBay. /d. at 1069. The court ruled that if Bidder's Edge's "activity is 
allowed to continue unchecked, it would encourage other auction aggTegators to engage 
in similar recursive searching of the eBay system such that eBay would suffer irreparable 
harm from reduced system performance, system unavailability, or data losses ... /d. at 1066. 
Therefore, based on the mere possibility of future harm by unidentified third parties, the 
court enjoined Bidder's Edge's robots from crawling eBay's publicly accessible website. Jd. 
at I 069, 1073. 
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sites.298 As detailed below, this is due in part to the way in which the 
statute was drafted, but also how the courts have interpreted the 
CFAA's provisions. 
A. The Constitutional Boundaries of Congressional Power 
The original drafters of the CFAA purposely defined the types of 
acts that would violate the statute rather broadly.299 Legislators were 
concerned that if they did otherwise, they would have to regularly 
amend the CFAA to keep up with the ever changing nature of com­
puter crime, owing to advancements in computer technology.300 Al­
though this has proven at times to be an attribute of the statute, it has 
also resulted in conduct falling within the literal language of the stat­
ute that Congress, arguably, never intended to be regulated by the 
Act, such as the access and use of publicly accessible factual 
information.301 
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Congress even has the 
power to create private property rights in factual information. Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the Constitution, also known as the Intellec­
tual Property Clause, is the source of Congress's power to enact copy­
right legislation.302 The same clause in the Constitution that allows 
Congress to enact copyright legislation to protect "original works of 
authorship" also restricts the power of Congress to create exclusive 
rights in information.303 Congress cannot constitutionally recognize 
private rights in raw facts. 304 In Graham v. john Deere Co.,305 the Su­
preme Court stated that in exercising its powers under the Intellectual 
Property Clause, Congress "may not overreach the restraints imposed 
298. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 253 (S.O.N.Y. 2000) 
(holding that the defendant's use of a software robot constituted unauthorized access 
under the CFAA). 
299. SeeS. REP. No. 104-357, at 5 (1996) (noting that the original drafters of the CFAA 
chose to address the problem of computer crime in a single statute, "rather than identify­
ing and amending every potentially applicable statute affected by advances in computer 
technology"). 
300. !d. 
301. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (holding that 
copyright protection does not extend to factual information). 
302. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu­
sive Right to their respective \Vritings and Discoveries .. ). 
303. See id.; see also Yochai Benkler, Constitutitmal Bounds ofDatahase Protection: 111£ Role of 
Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition ofPrivate Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TEcH. 
LJ. 535 (~000). 
304. !d. at 544 (citing Feis~ 499 U.S. at 351). 
305. 383 u.s. 1 (1966). 
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by the stated constitutional purpose."306 The Court further explained 
that the Intellectual Property Clause requires Congress to act only in 
situations where the extension of an exclusive right promotes 
"[i]nnovation, advancement, and ... add[s] to the sum of useful 
knowledge."307 Congress is therefore prohibited from enacting legis­
lation that encloses or burdens access to information or knowledge 
already available in the public domain.308 These limitations reflect a 
substantive concern towards granting anyone exclusive rights to con­
trol and benefit from ideas or facts. 309 
Additionally, Congress cannot bypass the restrictions of the Intel­
lectual Property Clause by enacting legislation to protect works that 
lack originality under a separate provision of the Constitution, such as 
the Commerce Clause.310 Decisions in cases such as Feist, which are so 
heavily based on the constitutionally protected status of public access 
to facts and information, in essence would be rendered meaningless if 
limitations on Congress's power under the Intellectual Property 
Clause could so easily be avoided. 311 The only case to address directly 
an Intellectual Property Clause challenge to legislation passed under 
the guise of Congress's Commerce Clause power, supports such an 
interpretation.312 In United States v. Moghadam, 313 the Eleventh Circuit 
held that there are "circumstances ... in which the Commerce Clause 
cannot be used by Congress to eradicate a limitation upon Congress 
in another grant of power."314 In so doing, the court recognized that 
Congress's power to create intellectual property-like rights under the 
Commerce Clause is limited by the substantive constraints imposed by 
the Intellectual Property Clause on the enactment of such rights.315 
These constraints would of course include the requirement of origi­
nality, which as explained above, is clearly missing in the case of fac­
tual information.316 
Even in the unlikely situation !pat Congress could enact legisla­
tion that extends copyright-like protection to factual information in 
compliance with the substantive requirements of the Intellectual 
306. !d. at 6. 
307. ld. 
308. Benkler, supra note 303, at 543. 
309. ld. at 54:1-44. 
310. ld. at 547-48. 
311. ld. at 545. 
312. Jd. at 546. 
313. 175 F.3d 1269 (lith Cir. 1999). 
314. !d. at 1280. 
315. See id. at 128().81; Benkler, supra note 303, at 547-48. 
316. See supra ('art II (discussing the requirements for copyright protection). 
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Property Clause, the private rights would still be subject to First 
Amendment review.317 Although the government's intent may not be 
to suppress speech, nonetheless such a restriction must be shown to 
serve an important state interest and that "the incidental restriction 
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of that interest."318 Such a review must take into 
account the Supreme Court's conclusion that intellectual property 
rights do not conflict with the First Amendment precisely because of 
the requirement of originality and the doctrine of fair use.319 All of 
this suggests that courts should review with particular care legislation 
that creates exclusive rights in information without adhering to these 
fundamental principles.320 
Furthermore, courts could, and in fact should, interpret the 
CFAA to avoid such constitutional issues. Under the canon of consti­
tutional avoidance, when "a statute is susceptible of two constructions, 
by one ofwhich grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and 
by the other ofwhich such questions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to 
adopt the latter."321 The avoidance canon rests upon the judicial 
317. Benkler, supra note 303, at 552. 
318. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 
518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); 
Benkler, supra note 303, at 556, 588-89. 
Commentators have differed as to the appropriate level of review to apply to legisla­
tion that creates private rights in information, namely whether such a law is content-based, 
subjecting it to heightened scrutiny, or content-neutral, thus requiring a lesser, intermedi­
ate-level of review. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Ccpyright, 55 VAND. L. REv. 
891, 922 (2002) (contending that "copyright laws involve content-based suppression of 
speech in the simplest and most direct sense"); Mark A Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom 
of Speech and Injunctions in Intelkctual Property Ccses, 48 DuKE LJ. 147, 186 (1998) (stating 
that it is "incorrect to argue that intellectual property law is content-neutral and should 
therefore be subject to laxer rules [, thus,] rclopyright liability turns on the content of 
what is published"); Benkler, supra note 303, at 55!>-56 (observing that general informa­
tion-control rules are content-neutral, not content-based, as their purpose is the promo­
tion of speech generally, not of one particular speech determined by content). In the case 
of the CFM it would appear that the law is content-neutral as its protections extend to all 
information, not particular types of information. If this position is incorrect and the CFAA 
could instead be characterized as a content-based regulation, this would make the starnte 
even more constitutionally suspect. 
319. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also 
Benkler, supra note 303, at 588. The doctrine of fair use in copyright law, for example, 
allows an individual to utilize protected portions of another's work without permission, for 
such things as public commentary, criticism, or parody. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 
U.S. at 547 n.2. 
320. See Benkler, supra note 303, at 588 (discussing constitutional review of legislation 
creating rights similar to intellectual property rights). 
321. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 555 (2002) (quoting United States ex rei. 
Attorney Gen. v.. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)). 
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branch's "respect for Congress, which [courts assume] legislates in the 
light of constitutional limitations."322 Unfortunately, in recent cases 
involving the CFAA, courts instead have construed the Act in such a 
way as to make it constitutionally suspect.323 
B. Delineating the Proprietary Rights of Website Owners 
Courts consistently have granted website owners the exclusive 
right to regulate the terms upon which access is granted to their pub­
licly available Internet sites, as well as the manner in which any non­
copyrightable information contained therein is utilized.324 The typi­
cal review of a website owner's terms is best illustrated by the Register. 
com court's conclusory statement in connection with its cursory analy­
sis of Register.com's CFAA claim: "[B]ecause Register.com objects to 
Verio's use of search robots they represent an unauthorized access to 
the [contact information] database."325 Courts evaluating CFAA 
claims have not limited the manner in which website owners exercise 
the power to exclude. Although such a power may be a fundamental 
right of a property owner,326 it is not absolute.327 For example, "[t]he 
owner of real property has never held an unrestricted right to exclude 
strangers or regulate activity upon its premises."328 Instead, the con­
tours of the "relationship[] between landowners and those [either] 
seeking entry to or already present" upon another's land have histori­
cally been refined by the common Iaw.329 
In fact, the Second Restatement of Torts contains more than 
twenty sections [that relate to] "privileged" entries onto land 
over the owner's objections. These include: ... entry to 
abate a private nuisance[.] ... entry by a traveler on a public 
highway that has become impassable to enter neighboring 
322. /d. at 556 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991)). 
323. See infra Section V.B (questioning the constitutionality of courts' interpretation of 
the CFAA). 
324. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (granting an injunction based on unauthorized access where the defendant accessed 
eBay's website in violation of the plaintiff's Terms of Use). 
325. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
326. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (characterizing the right to 
exclude as one of the most essential sticks in a property owner's bundle of rights). 
327. Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 633, 667 (1991). 
328. /d. Blackstone wrote that the right of property must be exclusive, with every entry 
onto land without the owner's permission amounting to a trespass or transgression; he 
qualified this statement, however, by listing numerous situations in which entry onto land 
was in fact permissible. 3 \VJLLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMEI\.'TARIES *209. 
329. Berger, supra note 327, at 667. 
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land to continue his or her journey[.] and entry because of 
private necessity.3~0 
Additionally, in the case of a publicly accessible website, the 
owner has already opened its "land" to the general public.331 This 
occurs when the website owner chooses to post uncopyrightable infor­
mation to an Internet site that can be viewed by virtually anyone with 
an Internet connection. As such, it should be expected that by doing 
so, the owner of a publicly accessible website relinquishes some of the 
autonomy owners of private property might traditionally enjoy.332 In­
stead, courts have, to some extent, automatically granted legal recog­
nition to the restrictions of website owners without considering the 
effect on society.333 
Allowing owners of publicly accessible websites to utilize the 
CFAA to enforce restrictions placed on access to and use of un­
copyrightable information alters the balance of rights struck by copy­
right law. Copyright seeks to provide sufficient protection to authors, 
so that they have incentives to create.334 This is balanced, however, by 
the primary objective of copyright law, namely to ensure society's ac­
cess to copyrighted works in order to "promote the Progress of Sci­
ence and useful Arts."335 
However, courts interpreting the CFAA have unconstitutionally 
allowed website owners to unilaterally change this balance to their ad­
vantage. Website owners have successfully used the statute to enclose 
information that belongs in the public domain.336 In so doing, these 
website owners are not just hindering their competitors, but nega­
tively affecting society as well. By restricting their competitors' access 
to and use of this uncopyrightable information, these website owners 
330. /d. The notes to section 197 contain ~£teen examples of private necessity, includ­
ing a passerby that enters a private dwelling after hearing screams of distress from inside 
and an aviator that is forced to make an emergency landing on another's field. /d. at 667 
n.198 (discussing the Section 197 illustrations). 
331. S.e Berger, supra note 327, at 652-57 (distinguishing between truly private places, 
such as the home, and public spaces, like shopping centers). But see Uoyd Corp. v. Tanner, 
407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) (declaring that property does not "lose its private character 
merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes"). How­
ever, as discussed infra, an argument can be made that the holding of this case should be 
narrowly construed. 
332. Berger, supra note 327, at 636. 
333. See Luh, supra note 98 (suggesting that preventing access to publicly accessible con­
tent "threatens the openness of the Internet"). 
334. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 449 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). 
335. ld. at 349; U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
336. Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 180-82 (discussing eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 
100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ). 
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are denying the public the benefits that accrue from increased compe­
tition in the marketplace."37 
Furthermore, the enforcement of a website owner's restrictions 
on data contained on a publicly accessible website undermines the 
balance struck between copyright law and the First Amendment.338 
Utilization of the CFAA to enforce a website owner's restrictions on 
publicly available factual information results in the enclosure of the 
public domain with a shift in the legal status of information that is not 
caused by the absence of government regulation.339 Instead, it is the 
result of a governmental decision that such restrictions are enforced 
and it "is no less and no more a regulatory decision than the decision 
not to enforce them."340 As such, the First Amendment's injunction 
that "Congress shall make no law" is engaged, and any legislation that 
directly regulates information production and exchange must be 
shown to serve an important government interest without restricting
341substantially more speech than necessary. Although protecting the 
integrity of computer systems and confidential information may qual­
ify as a laudable legislative goal, the CFAA's provisions as drafted and 
interpreted by the courts are significantly more restrictive of speech 
than necessary to serve these interests. 
The fact that the information collected and utilized by software 
robots would most likely be characterized as "commercial speech" as 
opposed to "non-commercial speech" does not alter this conclu­
sion.342 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that society has a right to 
receive commercial speech.343 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, lnc.,344 the Court stated, 
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise econ­
omy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be 
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a 
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggre­
337. /d. at 182. 
338. See Benkler, supra note 176, at 358 (asserting that "[e]nclosure ... conflicts with the 
First Amendment injunction that government not prevent people from using information 
or communicating it,.). 
339. See id. at 359-60 (discussing enacted and proposed legislation that is part of the 
"enclosure movement," including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Article 2B (now 
UCITA), and the Collections of Information Anti piracy Act). See generally Alan E. Garfield, 
Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 261 (1998). 
340. Benkler, supra note 176, at 433. 
341. /d. at 394, 413. 
342. See Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
765-66 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to state restrictions on commercial speech). 
343. ld. at 765. 
344. 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
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gate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free 
flow of commercial information is indispensable.345 
Additionally, the Court recognized that 
[a]s to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of 
commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not 
keener by far, than his interest in the days most urgent politi­
cal debate . . . . Therefore, even if the First Amendment 
were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten 
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that 
the free flow of information does not serve that goal.346 
Despite the Supreme Court's recognition of the importance of 
First Amendment interests, the Court has not always held that private 
property owners must give way to such rights.347 In a series of cases, 
the Supreme Court has vacillated on the proper balance between First 
Amendment rights and private property rights. In Amalgamated Food 
Emplayees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, lnc., 348 the Supreme 
Court held that picketing on the sidewalks and a parking lot adjacent 
to a non-union store by local union members could not be enjoined 
by the shopping center because it would be an impermissible con­
straint on the protestors' First Amendment rights.349 But four years 
later in Lloyd Curp. v. Tanner, 350 the Court overruled Logan Valley, hold­
ing that the First Amendment does not prevent a private shopping 
center owner from prohibiting the distribution of leaflets protesting 
the Vietnam War on its premises.351 Lastly, in Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 352 the Supreme Court held that a state did not violate 
a property owner's First and Fifth Amendment rights by granting indi­
viduals the right to enter a privately owned shopping center and 
gather petitions.353 
In attempting to reconcile these various opinions, it is important 
to keep in mind that in balancing private property interests against 
constitutional rights, the Court weighs the effect of any expressive ac­
345. ld. at 765. 
346. ld. at 763, 765 (footnotes omitted). 
347. E.g.. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (holding that a privately 
owned shopping center that allowed public access was not dedicated to the public use for 
the exercise of political speech). 
348. 391 u.s. 308 (1968). 
349. ld. at 325. 
350. 407 u.s. 551 (1972). 
351. ld. at 570. 
352. 447 u.s. 74 (1980). 
353. !d. at 88; see also Berger, supra note 327, at 633-94 (evaluating Pruneyard and arguing 
for recognition of-free speech right in shopping malls). 
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tivity, as well as the attendant public benefit.354 In the case of a web­
site owner attempting to use the CFAA to prevent a software robot 
from accessing and utilizing uncopyrightable information posted on 
an Internet site, the balance clearly should be struck in favor of First 
Amendment rights. The software robot is collecting data that is not 
constitutionally entitled to protection.355 It is information that cannot 
be owned by any one party, as it is part of the public domain.356 Addi­
tionally, in most instances the data provides the basis for more effec­
357tive competition against the website owner. Despite the website 
owner's views to the contrary, such competition is desirable.358 As dis­
cussed above, the public benefits from a marketplace with increased 
options.359 
Furthermore, to the extent that a software robot occupies a por­
tion of the website owner's computer server, the intrusion is mini­
maJ.360 The software robot does not interfere with a potential 
customer's ability to access information on the website owner's In­
ternet site, as both entities can do so simultaneously.361 Additionally, 
unlike picketing or the gathering of petitions on private shopping 
mall property, a software robot's expressive activity does not cause any 
disruption to commercial business occurring on the website.362 Also, 
the typical software robot causes absolutely no harm to the website 
owner's computer system or the integrity of the data contained 
therein.363 
The CFAA as currently drafted and interpreted by recent court 
decisions grants too much proprietary control to website owners at the 
364public's expense. These decisions upset the careful balance of 
rights that the Copyright Act has struck between authors and soci­
ety.365 Using this power, these owners of publicly accessible Internet 
354. See Pruneyard. 447 U.S. at 88; see also O'Rourke; sufrra note 18, at 619; Berger, sufrra 
note 327, at 67~4. 
355. Facts are not entitled to protection because they are not "original." Feist Publ'ns, 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). 
356. ld. at 347-48. 
357. Elkin-Karen, sufrra note 12, at 182. 
358. Jd. 
359. See sufrra Part IV. 
360. O'Rourke, sufrra note 18, at 565. 
361. ld. at 565-66. 
362. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (noting that while the defendant's robot accessed eBay 100,000 times daily, the de­
fendant's queries only constituted at most 1.53% of total daily requests). 
363. Luh, sufrra note 98. 
364. Elkin-Karen, sufrra note 12, at 182. 
365. See Benkler, sufrra note 176, at 386-94 (discussing the relationship between copy· 
right law and the First Amendment). 
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sites have attempted to stifle the free flow of information in order to 
prevent legitimate competition that could effect their bottom Iine.~66 
To the extent that relief from truly harmful robotic activity is war­
ranted, the CFAA is not the appropriate vehicle for providing redress. 
VII. AN AMENDMENT AND AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CFAA 
As discussed above, the CFAA was never designed to protect in­
formation contained on publicly accessible websites. 367 Furthermore, 
court interpretations that allow for the protection of facts in such 
cases are constitutionally suspect.368 Instead, the statute was promul­
gated to provide relief to true victims of hacking, parties whose com­
puter systems or confidential data actually had been compromised.369 
In order to ensure that the CFAA is properly utilized in the future, the 
statute needs to be amended. 
Earlier it was noted that all fifty states have some form of com­
puter crime legislation.370 In detailing the various offenses, two states, 
namely Louisiana and Mississippi, include identical provisions which 
provide that the criminal statute does not apply to "disclosure, use, 
copying, taking or accessing by proper means."371 The term "proper 
means" is defined in part as "observation of the property in public use 
or on public display."372 
Similar language could be added to the CFAA to ensure that 
software robots can access and utilize information on publicly availa­
366. Elkin-Karen, supra note 12, at 182. 
367. See supra Part III. 
368. See Feist Publ"ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,349-50 (1991) (explain· 
ing that the Intellectual Property Clause offers copyright protection for original works, not 
unoriginal facts). 
369. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 
(2000)) (adding a civil remedy provision to the CFM). 
370. See supra note 59 (providing a comprehensive list of state computer crime 
legislation). 
371. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14:73.2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); MISS. CooE ANN.§ 97-45-9 
(2001). 
372. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14:73.1(11) (West 2001); M1ss. CooE ANN.§ 97-45-1 (k) (1994 
& Supp. 2003). The full definition as provided in Mississippi's statute is as follows: 
(k) "Proper means" includes: 
(i) Discovery by independent invention; 
(ii) Discovery by "reverse engineering"; that is, by starting with the known prod­
uct and working backward to find the method by which it was developed. The 
acquisition of the known product must be by laMul means; 
(iii) Discovery under license or authority of the owner; 
(iv) Observation of the property in public use or on public display; or 
(v) Discovery in published literature. 
/d. 
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ble websites without violating the Act. The civil action provision373 
could be amended with the following language: 
No action may be brought under this subsection for the dis­
closure, use, copying, taking, or accessing of a computer to 
obtain information on public display. 
Further, "public display" could be defined as follows: 
The term "public display" includes information available to 
the public without a fee, including information on publicly 
accessible Internet websites. 
Although this exemption would apply to both copyrightable and un­
copyrightable information, a copyright owner would not be prevented 
from utilizing the copyright laws to obtain relief where warranted. 
This proposed change to the CFAA is not meant to suggest that 
an owner of a publicly accessible Internet site is completely without a 
remedy. However, the proper theory upon which relief may be 
granted must appropriately balance the website owner's proprietary 
rights with the public benefit that ensues from the free flow of infor­
mation. Dan Burk has suggested a modified version of the common 
law claim of nuisance as an alternative to website owners' trespass ac­
tions, but it would also appear to be an acceptable substitute for a 
CFAA claim.374 This is due to the fact that such a cause of action lies 
only if the cost of the intrusive conduct outweighs the benefit.375 
Burk explains that "the 'muddy' nature of nuisance would allow com­
puter owners on the Net to exclude unreasonably costly use of their 
servers, while allowing access for socially beneficial uses, even if the 
server owner might otherwise object."376 
Certainly a website owner would still have the option of physically 
disconnecting from the Internet to avoid any undesirable uses, but 
doing so would also result in the loss of the attendant benefits of be­
. ing part of such a network. 377 However, as Burk points out, "proper 
application of the nuisance standard would make this drastic action 
unattractive on average to rational server owners."378 Instead, website 
owners more likely will tolerate the occasional "unwelcome" visitor or 
"undesirable" use in order to take advantage of the commercial expo­
sure that the placement of a website on the Internet brings. A remedy 
373. 18 u.s.c. § 1030(g) (2003). 
374. See Burk, supra note 255, at 53-54 (discussing digital nuisance as an alternative to 
trespass actions). 
375. Id. at 53-54. 
376. /d. at 53. 
377. /d. 
378. Id. 
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such as digital nuisance, therefore, would recognize that a website 
owner has some limited proprietary rights in its Internet site, but en­
sure that those rights are not exercised to the public's detriment. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The CFAA was enacted to provide protection from incidents of 
computer hacking.379 Despite recent court decisions suggesting the 
contrary,380 the statute was never intended to afford website owners 
with a method for obtaining absolute control over access to and use of 
information they have chosen to post on their publicly accessible In­
ternet sites. Additionally, such sweeping interpretations of the CFAA 
threaten the continued openness of the Internet and competition in 
the marketplace to the public's detriment. 381 The CFAA, therefore, 
needs to be amended to ensure that only those entities that have suf­
fered the type of harm for which the statute was designed obtain re­
lief. Hopefully this will also encourage courts, when faced with similar 
types of claims in the future, to strike a more proper balance in ren­
dering decisions on the proprietary rights of website owners. 
379. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 3-5 (1996). 
380. E.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(enjoining Verio from using a web robot to access publicly available factual information on 
Register.com's website). 
381. Elkin-Koren, sufna note 12, at 181-82. 
